STRATEGIA AND HEGEMONIA IN
FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENS[1]

THOSE who have studied the Athenian system of command in the fifth century have confined themselves almost entirely to the period after 440 B.C. They have raked over the evidence to discover signs of double representation of one tribe on the board of strategi, or of a supreme στρατηγός among the στρατηγοί, or of a chairman at least of the board of strategi. On the other hand little attention is paid to the progressive diminution of the military functions of the *archon polemarchus* within the state and to the great problems created in external affairs by the Persian Wars with the formation of the Greek League and then of the Athenian Alliance. Yet these matters are vital to the evolution of the system of command which can be seen in operation after 440 B.C. In particular the decisive steps were probably taken in 480–466 B.C., when Athens' national system of command had first to be integrated into a command-system of combined forces headed by Sparta in the Persian Wars and then adapted to take over the command of combined forces in continuous warfare against Persia. In this article I try to study the whole field and to avoid applying to the early part of the period the theories which have been evolved hitherto with special reference to Pericles in 440–428 B.C. The article consists of the following sections. A, Strategos and Hegemon in 501/0. B, τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡγεμονίας. C, current ideas on the modern term στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων. D, the historical origins of the so-called στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων. E, summary of conclusions.

A. STRATEGOS AND HEGEMON IN 501/0

ἔπειτα τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ᾑροῦντο κατὰ φυλάς, ἐξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα, τῆς δὲ ἁπάσης στρατιᾶς ἡγεμὼν ἦν ὁ πολέμαρχος. *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2. 'Then they began to elect the strategi by tribes, one from each tribe, and the polemarch was hegemon of the whole force.' Generally speaking, this sentence confirmed the inference which Grote had drawn earlier from statements of Herodotus and Plutarch, that one 'fruit of the Kleisthenean constitution' was the creation of ten strategi, one from each tribe, and the retention of some traditional powers by the polemarch. The sentence, then, seemed to be fully acceptable as evidence for a historical development in the relationship between strategi and polemarch, and indeed to be derived, like the succeeding sentences on ostracism, from a reputable Atthidographic source. Unfortunately much more than this has been deduced from the sentence.[2] For example, E. M. Walker wrote as follows in *CAH* iv. 154. 'It would appear from Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, 22. 2 (though the passage is somewhat obscurely worded) that it was in the year 501–500 B.C. that the re-organization of the army on the basis of

[2] C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford, 1952), 169 f. gives a good summary of the interpretations and the elaborations of this sentence in *Ath. Pol.* 22.

2. He himself opens the discussion with these words: 'as the polemarch had previously been commander-in-chief of the army, the final clause of the statement must mean that his position was not affected by the change'. It seems to me that neither of his two points is implicit in the sentence and that both of them are disproved by the evidence of Herodotus, to which I shall come later.

the ten tribes was effected. Corresponding to each tribe there was to be a *taxis*,
or regiment, of hoplites, and a squadron of cavalry. The *taxis* was thus a tribe in
its military aspect. It was commanded by a *strategos*, or general, who was
elected by the corresponding tribe. The institution of the office of strategos was
to prove one of the most important changes that were ever effected in the
Athenian constitution. From the first the strategi were General Officers, as well
as commanders of the regiments, though the supreme command was still
exercised by the Polemarch.'[1]

Inasmuch as Walker was commenting on this sentence in its context within
the *Athenian Politeia*, almost everything he says is incorrect. The sentence is not
obscurely worded, if we take it in relation to the whole treatise. In the first
part of the sentence, 'then they began to elect the strategi by tribes, one from
each tribe', 'they' are the Athenians as in the preceding and the succeeding
sentences. The words κατὰ φυλάς do not mean that the generals were elected
each by one tribe, 'by the corresponding tribe' in Walker's words. The phrase
is common in the treatise. In the sentence in the very same chapter in section 5
ἐκυάμευσαν τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας κατὰ φυλάς the phrase κατὰ φυλάς means that
the Athenians selected the nine archons by lot by tribes, i.e. at one a tribe. The
phrase κατὰ φυλάς has this meaning again at 42. 2 συλλεγέντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν
κατὰ φυλάς; at 48. 1 εἰσὶ δ' ἀποδέκται δέκα κεκληρωμένοι κατὰ φυλάς; at 56. 3
εἰσὶ δ' οἱ μὲν εἰς Διονύσια κατὰ φυλάς; at 63. 1 τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια κληροῦσιν οἱ θ'
ἄρχοντες κατὰ φυλάς; and at 63. 4 νενέμηνται γὰρ κατὰ φυλὰς δέκα μέρη οἱ
δικάσται. In order to make the matter doubly clear, the *Ath. Pol.* sometimes
adds the phrase ἐξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα or a similar phrase. This phrase is added
in our sentence, and a similar phrase is added repeatedly, in 63. 2 for example.
The meaning of 22. 2 can be only this, that the Athenians as a body (pre-
sumably in the Ecclesia) began to elect the generals one from each tribe so that
all the tribes were represented.[2]

'The institution of the office of strategos', which Walker sees as the innova-
tion,[3] cannot be the innovation which the *Ath. Pol.* intends to convey. In the

[1] I quote the views of E. M. Walker be-
cause they raise many of the issues which
have been associated with this passage.
Many others have expressed similar views.
E. Meyer, *GdA* iii². 745, 'im J. 502 wurden
zuerst zehn Strategen als Kommandanten
des Aufgebots der einzelnen Phylen gewählt
. . . Mit dem Polemarchen zusammen, der
den Vorsitz hatte und den rechten Flügel
kommandierte, bildeten die Strategen den
Kriegsrat.' U. von Wilamowitz-Moellen-
dorff, *Aristoteles und Athen* ii. 78, 'die Feldherrn
immer noch Regiments-Commandeure unter
dem Commando des Polemarchen blieben.'
G. Glotz, *Histoire grecque* i. 482, 'la nation
eut à sa tête les dix stratèges qui exerçaient
chacun le commandement supérieur sous
l'autorité désormais nominale du polé-
marque.' A. Ledl, *Studien zur älteren athenischen
Verfassungsgeschichte* 339, 'Aus Arist. *Ath. Pol.*
22. 2 lernen wir daß die Athener im Jahre
502/1 zum ersten Male . . . die zehn Strate-
gen phylenweise . . . erwählten, während der
Polemarchos noch immer Kommandant des

Gesamtaufgebotes blieb' (adding in a foot-
note that the strategi were originally 'nur
Phylenobersten'). Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechi-
sche Staatskunde* 881, 'der Polemarchos behielt
außer gewissen Ehrenrechten Stimmrecht
und Vorsitz im Kriegsrat der Strategen,
Oberbefehlshaber war er nur noch nominell.'
This last view is followed by W. Schwahn,
'Strategos' in R. E. Suppl. vi (1935), 1073.

[2] So Busolt–Swoboda, op. cit. 881 ('seit
501/0 wählte jedoch die gesamte Bürger-
schaft die zehn Strategen und zwar je einen
aus jeder Phyle'), and S. Accame in *Riv. di
fil.* lxiii (1935), 342. It is probable that the
tribes each elected their candidates and that
the Assembly elected the ten strategi from
these candidates, the strategi thus being
αἱρετοὶ ἐκ τῶν προκριθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν φυλετῶν
(a method such as is stated in *Ath. Pol.* 31. 1).

[3] So H. T. Wade-Gery in *C.Q.* xxvii
(1933), 28, 'I argue . . . that Kleisthenes
created the Strategoi *c.* 500 B.C., as a Secular
Executive destined to displace the Archons:
the Archons' degradation was a corollary of

very same chapter, indeed in the following section, the *Ath. Pol.* says that
Peisistratus—some sixty years before 501–500 B.C.—had been a strategos; in
another chapter reference is made to a command in the war against Megara for
Salamis (17. 2 στρατηγεῖν); and in the so-called constitution of Draco, which,
unhistorical or not, is part of the *Ath. Pol.*, the qualifications of candidates for
the office of strategos are defined. Nor does the innovation lie for the *Ath. Pol.*
in the use of election;[1] for they 'elected' (ᾑροῦντο) the strategi in the constitu-
tion of Draco in 4. 2. So far as the *Athenaion Politeia* is concerned, the innovation
lies in the system of having one general from each tribe of Cleisthenes' ten tribes.

When we look outside the *Ath. Pol.*, we find several mentions of sixth-century
strategi at Athens: the strategia of Peisistratus against Megara (Hdt. 1. 59. 4, ἐν
τῇ πρὸς Μεγαρέας γενομένῃ στρατηγίᾳ); the voting powers of the strategi *vis-à-vis*
the archon polemarchus τὸ παλαιόν as opposed to their powers in 490 B.C. (Hdt.
6. 109. 2; see p. 122 below); Peisistratus as a strategus becoming tyrant
(*FGrH* 324 Androtion F 6); the general association of tyranny with positions
of military command (Arist. *Politics* 1305ᵃ8 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅτε ὁ αὐτὸς δημ-
αγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγός; see T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* 57, n. 4 for the
sixth-century connotation of ἀρχαίων) and the citation of Peisistratus in that
context (1305ᵃ21–24); the record at Delphi of Alcmaeon being strategus of the
Athenian force *c.* 591 B.C. in the Sacred War (Plu. *Solon* 11. 2 Ἀθηναίων
στρατηγὸς ἀναγέγραπται). It is unlikely that each of these strategi was appointed
only for a single campaign and endowed with *ad hoc* military and financial
powers. They were almost certainly annually elected magistrates; for the
Solonian state was highly developed in the establishment of ἀρχαί, not least in
matters involving finance. That the office was called the strategia, as Herodotus
and Plutarch suppose, is most likely; for the word στρατηγός was used in
archaic times.[2]

Walker's attempt to throw a double by arguing that the *Ath. Pol.*'s στρατηγοί
are at the same time both General Officers and contingent commanders is not
justified by the context of the treatise. For it names the contingent commanders
as ἵππαρχοι under the constitution of Draco (4. 2) and as ταξίαρχοι later (30. 2;

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the creation of the Strategoi, yet this corol-
lary was postponed for fourteen years, since
Kleisthenes lost power *c.* 499 B.C.' On the
other hand C. Hignett, op. cit. 172, 'although
the positive evidence is weak, the strategoi
must have existed in the Solonian state, if not
earlier.' So too Schwahn, loc. cit. 1071,
argues that the strategi were not state officials
but tribal officials in Solon's state, because
they are not mentioned in *Ath. Pol.* 7. 3. His
argument is not conclusive, because the list
in *Ath. Pol.* 7. 3 is not complete; for it men-
tions no military or naval officials and not
even the naucrari, who figure in 8. 3.

[1] Indeed it would be absurd to suppose
that military commanders had been ap-
pointed before 501 B.C. by any method other
than election; the principle laid down by
Ath. Pol. 43. 1 is applicable to the sixth
century as well as to the fifth and the fourth
centuries: χειροτονοῦσι . . . τὰς πρὸς τὸν
πόλεμον (ἀρχὰς) ἁπάσας.

[2] For Solonian ἀρχαί see Ruschenbusch in
Historia Einzelschriften 9 (1966), F 79–80, and
for στρατηγός see Archilochus 58. 1 and
Aeschylus, *Septem* 816. Herodotus used
στρατηγός of commanders generally and it is
clear that he was not always using the word
local to each country; but the meaning in
each case is that the strategi are commanders
of a state's forces or of a coalition's forces and
not of a contingent. Thus we find ὁ Φωκαιεὺς
στρατηγός (Hdt. 6. 11. 1) and οἱ στρατηγοὶ
τῶν Σαμίων (6. 13. 1), as well as οἱ στρατηγοὶ
τῶν Ἰώνων (5. 109. 1), οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν
Ἑλλήνων (9. 82. 3), οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν βαρ-
βάρων (8. 15. 1), and οἱ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου
στρατηγοί (8. 50. 1). When he had occasion
to speak of the commander of a contingent,
he used the word ταξίαρχος, for example of
the insubordinate subordinate officer Amom-
pharetus at Plataea (9. 53. 2), although the
word was probably used not at Sparta but at
Athens (it occurs first in Aeschylus fr. 182).

61. 3; and 61. 5); both officers are mentioned after 'strategi'. The word στρατη-γός has only one meaning in the *Ath. Pol.*, that of an officer commanding the army. In any case Walker's theory does not commend itself to anyone with military experience; for the interests of one's own contingent are not necessarily the interests of the army as a whole, and it is unwise to entrust both to one officer.

Lastly, Walker's concessive clause 'though the supreme command was still exercised by the Polemarch' detracts from the term 'General Officers'. The Greek words στρατηγός and στρατηγεῖν mean to be leader of the army, not of a part of it, and to be a leader and not an officer subordinate to a leader (ὑποστρατηγεῖν).[1]

As we pass on to the second half of the sentence, we may recapitulate by saying that on this occasion, eleven years before the battle of Marathon, according to the *Ath. Pol.* the Athenians began the practice whereby the Ecclesia so elected the commanding officers of their army that there was one commanding officer from each tribe. The sentence continues 'and' (there is no antithesis) 'the *polemarchos* was *hegemon* of the whole force'. I translate στρατιά 'force' because that is its meaning in *Ath. Pol.* 19. 5, Ἀγχίμολον ἀπέστειλαν κατὰ θάλατταν ἔχοντα στρατιάν, where it covers naval and military forces; and because 'force' implies troops in the field, which is the implication of στρατιά in *Ath. Pol.* 37. 2 κατὰ τὴν στρατιὰν ἣν ἐξήγαγον. The consecutive reader of the *Ath. Pol.* needs no introduction at 22. 2 to the *polemarchos*. He is already aware from chapter 3 that the polemarch was first instituted when a king was unwarlike, that he was an archon or magistrate, that the official designation for one hold-ing the office was πολεμαρχεῖν, and that his official quarters were once the πολεμαρχεῖον. Already in the constitution of Draco (4. 2) the polemarch was one of the nine archons, and military commands were in the hands of *strategoi* and *hipparchoi*, for whom special qualifications were laid down. Next, in Solon's time, he and the other eight archons were concentrated in the Thesmotheteion (3. 5). Then in 17. 2 the reader learns that the belief that Peisistratus com-manded (στρατηγεῖν) in the war of Athens against Megara for the possession of Salamis should be rejected on chronological grounds (and evidently not on the ground that a *strategia* then was an anachronism). Thus the reader of the *Ath. Pol.*—and I am concerned with the meaning of the *Ath. Pol.* at the moment —has realized already, before he reads chapter 22. 2, that the *polemarchos* was one of the *archontes* and not one of the *strategoi*; that the *polemarchos* did not command the army; and that the *strategoi* and the *hipparchoi* did hold positions of command in the armed forces. If the reader had a shrewd suspicion that the chapter describing the constitution of Draco was an insertion in the treatise, he would make the same deductions from the other early chapters except that he would drop the *hipparchoi* out of the picture. When we consider not the meaning of the *Ath. Pol.* but the probable facts, it seems clear that when the polemarch became involved in civil duties as a magistrate in a growing state, he could no longer be available to exercise sole command of Athenian forces in the field, especially on expeditions overseas to Sigeum or even to Crisa in the Sacred War, and that the power of command was vested exclusively in *strategoi*, Alcmaeon being one in the 590s and Peisistratus being one in the 560s.

[1] Sophocles, *Ajax* 1105, puts the matter in a nutshell: ὕπαρχος ἄλλων δεῦρ᾽ ἔπλευσας, οὐχ ὅλων στρατηγός. Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1322ᵃ40 f. contrasting στρατηγοὶ καὶ πολέμαρχοι with subordinate officers; and also Pl. *Lg.* 755 b.

In 22. 2, then, as readers of the *Ath. Pol.* we expect to find the polemarch not exercising real powers of high command but retaining some residual power or privilege of his traditional office, when we read that 'he was *hegemon* of the whole force'. The natural meaning of the *Ath. Pol.* is, as Busolt saw, that the polemarch marched at the head of the armed forces on ceremonial occasions and on military occasions too when they left the city; as Busolt expressed it, 'der Polemarchos zog nach wie vor an der Spitze des Heeres aus der Stadt'.[1] Thus the polemarch was fulfilling a function of the ἡγεμονία, which had been originally the prerogative of the king at Athens and remained the prerogative of a king at Sparta, even if he was a minor (Hdt. 9. 10. 2 ἐγίνετο μέν νυν ἡ ἡγεμονίη Πλειστάρχου τοῦ Λεωνιδέω· ἀλλ᾿ ὁ μὲν ἦν ἔτι παῖς . . .).

In order to establish this interpretation of the sentence τῆς δὲ ἁπάσης στρατιᾶς ἡγεμὼν ἦν ὁ πολέμαρχος, we must show not only that the word ἡγεμών may bear this meaning within the usage of the *Ath. Pol.* but also that the picture of the archon polemarchus gradually and not at one fell swoop losing his powers is historically correct. Now the word ἡγεμών is used elsewhere in the treatise of a political leader (e.g. at 20. 4 Κλεισθένης ἡγεμὼν ἦν καὶ τοῦ δήμου προστάτης), and it expresses well the position of the leader in a state which had no organized party-system as one who leads the way and not as one who exercises command. The word ἡγεῖται, to which ἡγεμὼν ἦν is closely related, has of course several meanings, but the primary meaning is 'he goes before, leads the way'. We find this meaning in the sentence of *Ath. Pol.* 61. 1 which contains the words ὃς ἡγεῖται τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἂν ἐξίωσι: the general 'who leads the hoplites when they go out (of the city)'.[2] This example is all the more important because the sentence is written with a back reference in effect to *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2. It occurs in the second part of the treatise in which the methods described in the earlier stages of the constitution are contrasted with those of 'the existing constitution', either expressly (often in the form πρότερον μέν . . . νῦν δέ) or tacitly. In this case the contrast is with 22. 2, and I quote the passages together:

> 22. 2. ἔπειτα τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ᾑροῦντο κατὰ φυλάς, ἐξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα, τῆς δὲ ἁπάσης στρατιᾶς ἡγεμὼν ἦν ὁ πολέμαρχος.

'Then they began to elect the strategi by tribes, one from each tribe, and the polemarch was *hegemon* of the whole force.'

> 61. 1. χειροτονοῦσι . . . στρατηγοὺς δέκα, πρότερον μὲν ἀφ᾿ ⟨ἑκάστης⟩ φυλῆς ἕνα, νῦν δ᾿ ἐξ ἁπάντων· καὶ τούτους διατάττουσι τῇ χειροτονίᾳ, ἕνα μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὁπλίτας, ὃς ἡγεῖται τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ἂν ἐξίωσι.

'They elect ten generals now from the whole (electorate) but previously one from each tribe, and these they appoint by election severally (to special tasks), one to the hoplites who leads the hoplites when they go out.'

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[1] *Gr. Gesch.* i. 616; quoted with approval by J. E. Sandys in his commentary on *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2.

[2] The meaning of the passage seems to be misunderstood by Busolt–Swoboda, op. cit. 1121, where this one general is said to have 'commanded the army outside the boundaries of Attica' ('der das Heer außerhalb des Landesgrenzen befehligte'). Such an interpretation is refuted within the same chapter in section 4 where we learn that disciplinary

powers over the hoplites were executed not by one strategos ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν but by οἱ στρατηγοί. In practice too there is no indication that only one general, one 'Ober-befehlshaber', always commanded the hoplites in a campaign outside Attica—even at as late a date as the campaign which culminated in the battle of Chaeronea (D.S. 16. 85. 2 στρατηγοὺς κατέστησε τοὺς περὶ Χάρητα καὶ Λυσικλέα καὶ πανδημεὶ μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἐξέπεμψε τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν).

Thus in the manner of the treatise the significant changes are emphasized: the tribal representation replaced by the lack of tribal representation, and the hegemonal functions of the polemarch replaced by their allocation to members of the board of strategi.

This chapter 61. 1 brings us to the historical development of the polemarch's powers. The transfer of his hegemonal functions not only to the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν but, as we shall see, also to the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας (in *Ath. Pol.* 61. 1) was due to a decline in the importance of the archon polemarchus and to an increase in the prestige of the strategi. The time of the transfer has usually been placed in the fourth century, but this bears no relation to the decline of the archon polemarchus which must have taken place shortly after the lot was introduced in selecting the archons, i.e. shortly after 487/6. A more appropriate time is in the 470s when the prestige of all the archons was in decline and Athens' victories raised the popularity of her strategi and especially that of Cimon to the zenith. The first epigraphical mention of the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν is of a year *c.* 294/3, but this does not provide a *terminus post quem* because the surviving evidence is so slight. The first literary mention of a στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν may be in Lysias 32. 5, referring to 410/9 B.C., where two manuscripts read καταλεγεὶς Διόδοτος μετὰ Θρασύλου τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν and the other and much more numerous manuscripts read καταλεγεὶς Διόδοτος μετὰ Θρασύλου τῶν ὁπλιτῶν. As the reading is disputed, the matter is uncertain.[1] The first case in which a general acts as the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν should act in accordance with *Ath. Pol.* 61. 1 ὃς ἡγεῖται τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἂν ἐξίωσι, is in 407 B.C., when Alcibiades led the hoplites out along the Sacred Way to Eleusis (X. *HG.* 1. 40. 20 τὰ μυστήρια . . . κατὰ γῆν ἐποίησεν ἐξαγαγὼν τοὺς στρατιώτας ἅπαντας and Plu. *Alc.* 34 ἱερεῖς δὲ καὶ μύστας καὶ μυσταγωγοὺς ἀναλαβὼν καὶ τοῖς ὅπλοις περικαλύψας, ἦγεν ἐν κόσμῳ). He had been elected στρατηγός with special honours shortly before this, and it seems probable that he had been designated ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν and acted now as such.[2]

[1] Our text of the speech comes from D. H. *Lysias* 23 f. of which there are numerous manuscripts. Modern texts are based on differing selections of manuscripts. For example in 1899 H. Usener and L. Radermacher selected five of which only one (G) read καταλεγεὶς Διόδοτος μετὰ Θρασύλου τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, while in 1912 C. Hude selected a different five of which only two (G and T) had this reading. The editors themselves read respectively μετὰ Θρασύλου τῶν ὁπλιτῶν (in the Teubner edition) and [μετὰ Θρασύλου] τῶν ὁπλιτῶν (in the Oxford Classical Text). The record of readings adopted by some of the other editors of Lysias is as follows: C. Scheibe and E. S. Shuckburgh μετὰ Θρασύλου τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν; F. H. Baynes, C. G. Cobet, and Th. Thalheim μετὰ Θρασύλου [τοῦ ἐπὶ] τῶν ὁπλιτῶν; U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff [μετὰ Θρασύλου τοῦ ἐπὶ] τῶν ὁπλιτῶν. The *lectio difficilior* is certainly μετὰ Θρασύλου τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, and the sentence then has the point, not just that the wealthy Diodotus was on the hoplite register (e.g. καταλεγεὶς τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, for which Lysias in fact uses other expressions at 14. 7, 15. 7, and 9. 4), but that he was registered for service with Thrasyllus on a campaign outside Attica; it was this knowledge, then, which prompted him to make his financial settlement. There are, however, points to be made on the other side. I am grateful to Professor K. J. Dover who brought the complexity of the problem to my attention.

[2] Whatever else may have been involved in the proclamation of Alcibiades as ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ (X. *HG* 1. 4. 20), this function of *hegemonia* was performed by him on the march to Eleusis. The position of Alcibiades is discussed by K. J. Beloch, *Die attische Politik seit Perikles* (1884), 286 f., M. H. Jameson, 'Seniority in the Strategia' in *TAPA* lxxxvi (1955), 84 f., and K. J. Dover, *ΔΕΚΑΤΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΣ* in *JHS* lxxx (1960), 62. The words of Xenophon should be interpreted in the light of the context, which shows that Alcibiades was not sole general but one of a board of generals and that after this proclamation he was accom-

Another function laid upon the polemarch by law was to fight in battle as the right-hand man of the line, as we learn from Herodotus 6. 111. 1—a passage which I shall discuss more fully later. ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον ἔχειν κέρας τὸ δεξιόν. That was the case in 490 B.C. The law clearly applied only to a battle in Attica, and not to any battle in any theatre of war. We learn from the passage in *Ath. Pol.* 61. 1 that this function of the polemarch was transferred to another of the strategi: ἕνα δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, ὃς φυλάττει, κἂν πόλεμος ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γίγνηται, πολεμεῖ οὗτος.[1] It is evident too that before the transfer to the strategos the polemarch had been responsible for the defence of Attica, both preparatory (ὃς φυλάττει) and in combat, and it is likely that both these functions were taken from him at the same time. We find the term φυλακή used already in 445 B.C., when it was proposed that 'the strategi' should be responsible περὶ φυλακῆς Εὐβοίας (Tod, *GHI* no. 42, line 76), an area which lay outside the province of the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας.[2] The function of organizing the defence of Attica must always have been entrusted to an executive military authority, and it is difficult to resist the argument that, when the archon polemarchus was appointed by lot and became a civil rather than a military official, this function was transferred either to one of the strategi or to the board of strategi.[3] This step cannot reasonably be dated later than the 470s or 460s.

In the fourth century the archon polemarchus still conducted sacrifices to Harmodius and Aristogeiton—sacrifices instituted no doubt in the decade 510–500 B.C.—and to Artemis Agrotera and Enyalius, 'a survival of the duties performed in early times by the Polemarch in his military capacity', as Sandys remarks. But not only very early times; for the polemarch Callimachus conducted the sacrifice to Artemis Agrotera on the 6th of Boedromion in 490 B.C.[4] and the addition of sacrifices to Harmodius and Aristogeiton shows that the polemarch was the chief representative of the state in such matters in 510–500 B.C. In this field the polemarch of 510–490 B.C. must have had many sacrificial duties to perform. At a later date he has only the residual duties of sacrificing to Artemis Agrotera and Enyalius, to Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and to those fallen in war. When did the transfer of his other duties occur? Again we should expect it to have occurred in the 470s or the 460s; and this time we have definite evidence that an important state-sacrifice was conducted then not by the polemarch but by one of the strategi. In 468 B.C. when Cimon and his fellow generals had entered the theatre at the beginning of the Dionysiac

panied by Aristocrates and Adeimantus ἠρημένοι κατὰ γῆν στρατηγοί (*HG* 1. 4. 21). See further, p. 139 below. The privileges conferred by the term αὐτοκράτωρ did not include, or did not necessarily include, superior command over one's colleagues, since Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus were all αὐτοκράτορες (Th. 6. 8. 2), but they did involve freedom from some routine checks such as the ἐπιχειροτονία each prytany (*Ath. Pol.* 61. 2) and the dependence on the Boule (Th. 6. 26. 1). Plu. *Nicias* 12. 6 summarizes the purpose of the psephism which conferred these powers on Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus as ὅπως αὐτοκράτορες ὦσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ κἀνταῦθα κἀκεῖ, βουλευόμενοι καὶ πράττοντες.

[1] πολεμεῖ, as in LSJ⁹ πολεμέω I. 2.
[2] As in the routine agendum of the Assembly περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας (*Ath. Pol.* 43. 4), ἡ χώρα is Attica.
[3] Probably to one general in view of the fact that responsibility for important financial matters was put upon one strategus, namely Pericles, on several occasions. Incidentally with regard to the αἱ φυλακαί in Thucydides 2. 24. 1 I disagree with A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2 (1956) 81, 'they must be garrisons outside mainland Attica'.
[4] X. *Anab.* 3. 2. 12; Arist. *Eq.* 660 f. with Scholia.

Festival, over which the eponymous archon Apsephion presided, Cimon conducted the traditional sacrifice to Dionysus (Plu. *Cimon* 8. 8 Κίμων μετὰ τῶν συστρατήγων προελθὼν εἰς τὸ θέατρον ἐποιήσατο τῷ θεῷ τὰς νενομισμένας σπονδάς). We conclude then that by 468 B.C. some sacrificial duties of the archon polemarchus had been transferred to the military officials and that some division of functions had been made among the strategi, whether by appointment for the year or by special χειροτονία on each occasion.

Another residual function of the polemarch in the fourth century was the organization of the Epitaphios Agon with the aid of the strategi (*Ath. Pol.* 58. 1 and Sandys ad loc.). According to Thucydides (1. 34. 1) state funerals were governed by ὁ πάτριος νόμος and extended back before the Persian War.[1] Originally the polemarch is likely to have conducted any such ceremony, especially as he still sacrificed in the fourth century to those fallen in war, and it was presumably he who then spoke in honour of the dead.[2] We learn from Diodorus 11. 33. 3 under 479/8 B.C. that the Athenian state honoured the tombs of those who had fallen in the Persian War, held the Epitaphios Agon then for the first time, and passed a law that specially chosen orators should deliver the encomia on those who were given a state funeral. The orator so chosen was, according to Thucydides 2. 35. 6, a man 'of approved judgement and eminent reputation'. Here too we may see the devolution of a function of the archon polemarchus, a man elected annually up to 487/6 as being of 'approved judgement and eminent reputation', to another person specially chosen by the state from 479/8 onwards, when the system of sortition by lot no longer ensured that the archon polemarchus was outstanding in the requisite qualities.

Our study of the polemarch's functions in the sixth and following centuries may now be summarized. In the time of Solon the civil duties as opposed to the military duties of the polemarch were consolidated and probably increased when he joined the other archons in the Thesmotheteion. At this time too in his original function of commanding Athenian troops in the field he had been superseded by a strategos at least in operations overseas, as we have seen from the case of Alcmaeon in the First Sacred War. During the sixth century the polemarch voted on a par with the strategi (of whom the number is not known); he conducted certain state-sacrifices, including that to those fallen in war, and he probably delivered the encomium of such persons; in 490 B.C. he conducted the state-sacrifice to Artemis Agrotera, fought in the right-hand position of the hoplite line at Marathon in accordance with the then law, and fell in battle, being honourably mentioned in the painting in the Poecile Stoa. But the powers of the office were gradually declining. In 501/0 the general command of Athenian troops passed to ten strategi alone and the polemarch was only the titular head, the *hegemon*, of the Athenian army. In 487/6, if not before,[3] sortition replaced election in the choice of the archon polemarchus and

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[1] Thucydides 2. 35. 5 cites the burial at Marathon as exceptional to the (already established) custom.

[2] Such a speech was almost inevitable among Greeks and a formalization of the practice is attributed to Solon by Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72 F 24) and the Scholiast to Thucydides 2. 35. 1. The validity of the attribution is doubted by Ruschenbusch,

Historia Einzelschriften 9 (1966), F 144 and pp. 46, 49, 57, but Solon was certainly concerned with funerary customs. See also below, p. 142, n. 1.

[3] Hdt. 6. 109. 2 indicates that the polemarch of 490/89 had been chosen by lot; I discuss this passage in *JHS* lxxxviii (1968), 48.

inevitably diminished his prestige. In 479/8 the delivery of the speech in honour of those fallen in war was removed probably from the polemarch and given to a man specially chosen for the task. In 468 B.C. we find a state-sacrifice to Dionysus being conducted not by the polemarch but by one of the generals. It seems likely that the polemarch's functions of leading the hoplites in marching out of Athens and of organizing the defence of Attica (ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας) and fighting in person in Attica were transferred about this time also to two of the strategi whom the people appointed respectively ἕνα μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὁπλίτας ὃς ἡγεῖται τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἂν ἐξίωσι, ἕνα δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ὃς φυλάττει κἂν πόλεμος ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γίγνηται, πολεμεῖ οὗτος. Thus in the decades after 487/6 B.C. the polemarch ceased in several ways to be the *hegemon* τῆς ἁπάσης στρατιᾶς as he had been in 501/0 B.C.

Now that we have fitted the statement of the polemarch's position in *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2 into the general evolution of the polemarch's office, it is necessary to concentrate on the military aspects of the system whereby after 501/0 ten generals, elected one from each tribe, exercised military command and the polemarch was only the *hegemon* in certain limited respects. Such a system seems strange to a modern mind. In 1944 *mutatis mutandis* Montgomery would have been one of ten equal commanders, each chosen from the people of one geographical division of the country, and a deputy of the crown would have been titular head of the armed forces. This strangeness has led many scholars to distrust both the passage in *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2 and the account by Herodotus of the battle of Marathon. Yet the campaign of Marathon, as described by Herodotus, and supplemented by other sources, seems to show this system of *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2 not only in operation but also being successful. This can hardly be due to collusion. Shortly before the Persians landed at Marathon, Callimachus as archon polemarchus made the state-sacrifice to Artemis Agrotera. Then when the Persians landed, Militiades, one of the generals, proposed that the Athenians should take provisions and march out (Arist. *Rhet.* 1411ᵃ ἐπισιτισαμένους δεῖν ἐξιέναι). His proposal was carried and the Athenian hoplites marched out in column, led, we may suppose, by the *hegemon* Callimachus whom we find positioned later on the extreme right when the army was in line.

As regards the command, the Athenians were led by ten generals (Hdt. 6. 103. 1 ἦγον δέ σφεας στρατηγοὶ δέκα). Militiades was one of the ten[1] (τῶν ὁ δέκατος ἦν Μιλτιάδης), and he had been elected by the people (Hdt. 6. 104. 2 αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου), as no doubt his colleagues had been. The ten generals alone sat in council at Marathon and their votes being equal produced a dead-lock (Hdt. 6. 109. 2 τοῖσι δὲ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῖσι ἐγίνοντο δίχα αἱ γνῶμαι; cf. 6. 109. 4). The generals alone held the operational command, each having such command for one day[2] (Hdt. 6. 110 οἱ στρατηγοί, ὡς ... πρυτανηίη τῆς ἡμέρης, Μιλτιάδῃ παρεδίδοσαν). This description bears out completely the interpretation which I have set upon the statement in *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2 that in 501/0 the people elected the generals, one from each tribe, save that the allocation by tribe is not mentioned by Herodotus. However, we find explicit mention of

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[1] K. J. Dover, loc. cit., has shown very clearly that δέκατος αὐτός in such a context means one of ten generals, and it is obvious from the account by Herodotus that the ten generals had equal powers. As Dover says on p. 70, 'Herodotus cannot mean that Miltiades was superior in authority to the other nine.'

[2] For the other evidence on this matter, see my article 'The Campaign and the Battle of Marathon', *JHS* lxxxviii (1968) 13 ff.

tribal representation in Plu. *Cimon* 8. 8 where the generals of 469/8 B.C. are described as being one from each tribe (δέκα ὄντας, ἀπὸ φυλῆς μιᾶς ἕκαστον).

As regards the polemarch's position in battle I have already mentioned the law cited by Herodotus that he should hold the extreme position on the right wing. This was, of course, a position both of honour and of danger, traditionally held in primitive Greek states by the king, and then by his deputy or substitute, and it probably still had a religious significance in 490 B.C. But let us turn to Herodotus 6. 111. 1. He has given a precise description of the Athenian line at Marathon: ἐνθαῦτα δὴ ἐτάσσοντο ὧδε οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς συμβαλέοντες· τοῦ μὲν δεξιοῦ κέρεος ἡγέετο ὁ πολέμαρχος [Καλλίμαχος]· ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον ἔχειν κέρας τὸ δεξιόν. ἡγεομένου δὲ τούτου ἐξεδέκοντο ὡς ἀριθμέοντο αἱ φυλαί, ἐχόμεναι ἀλληλέων· τελευταῖοι δὲ ἐτάσσοντο, ἔχοντες τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας, Πλαταιέες. The polemarch is the right-hand man, the tribal contingents in turn come next to him, and last of all the Plataeans. Herodotus is talking not of command but of position in a line of troops (ἡγεομένου δὲ τούτου ἐξεδέκοντο). 'The law at that time', he says, 'was that the polemarch held the right-hand wing position'. We could hardly hope for better evidence in support of the statement of *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2, that the polemarch was *hegemon* of the armed forces in and after 501/0 B.C.

At this point I must digress in order to discuss two other cases where the word ἡγεμών is used, because the meaning of the word at *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2 and in these cases is disputed, some believing ἡγεμών to mean 'commander-in-chief'.[1]

In 429 B.C. the Odrysian king, Sitalces, having planned a great expedition to which Athens as his ally was to contribute ships and troops, brought with him an Athenian Hagnon as ἡγεμών (Th. 2. 95. 3 ἧγε . . . καὶ ἡγεμόνα Ἅγνωνα). It is not clear in the Greek whether Hagnon was already ἡγεμών or was intended to become ἡγεμών. Now it is unreasonable to suppose either that Sitalces had resigned or intended to resign the command of his vast army to Hagnon (indeed Hagnon is not mentioned in the subsequent operations) or that Sitalces intended to impose Hagnon as commander on the as yet unassigned Athenian force, which the Athenian Assembly was proposing to vote no doubt with its own chosen generals for the campaign. The meaning is rather that Sitalces granted to Hagnon, or intended Hagnon to hold, a position of prestige on his staff of generals and to act in a literal sense as ἡγεμών, leading the army of Sitalces on the march overland to Macedonia (Th. 2. 98 indicates the route), whereas the Athenian ships and troops were to proceed from Athens to Chalcidice by sea (Th. 2. 95. 3), no doubt under generals appointed by the Athenian Assembly. The situation in 426 B.C. is very similar. The Acarnanians, having gone to the help of the Argives and the Amphilochians against the Ambraciotes and being in position at Argos, sent for Demosthenes (who had just commanded an Athenian expedition in Aetolia) ὅπως σφίσιν ἡγεμὼν γένηται (Th. 3. 105. 3) and for twenty Athenian ships which were at sea under the

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[1] Most scholars have supposed that a ἡγεμών had to be a supreme commander, and in consequence they cannot accept the idea that Callimachus was *hegemon* but Miltiades was commander on the day of battle, or again that Demosthenes was *hegemon* but the Acarnanian generals shared the command with him (see, for instance, K. J. Dover, loc. cit. 72, who thinks Herodotus was inventing, and A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2. 241 'ἡγεμών implies that Hagnon was to lead the Athenian army when it arrived' and 2. 422 'Demosthenes was in command (107. 2) but on a *political* question of this nature the Acarnanian leaders would certainly want to be consulted'). For the operations in Amphilochia see my article in *BSA* xxxvii. 128 f.

command of Aristotle and Hierophon. In this case too it is unreasonable to suppose that the Acarnanians and their allies intended to resign the command of their national forces to Demosthenes or that they intended to impose Demosthenes as commander of the twenty Athenian ships over the heads of the generals who had been appointed by the Athenian Assembly. Rather the Acarnanians and their allies wanted Demosthenes to become one of their board of generals and to hold on it a position of prestige, which included the leading place on the march and the right-hand place in the line of battle, whereas the Athenian ships, if they came, would be under the command of their own duly appointed Athenian generals.

My explanation of the term ἡγεμών in these two passages cannot be tested in Hagnon's case, because we hear no more of him, but it can be tested in Demosthenes' case. The twenty Athenian ships came into the Gulf of Arta and acted separately off Olpae (Th. 3. 107. 1 and 2), while Demosthenes came, probably overland, from Naupactus with 200 Messenian hoplites and 60 Athenian archers and joined the Acarnanian land forces who were preparing to engage the enemy (Th. 3. 107. 1 and 2). It is at this point that the Acarnanians, the Amphilochians, and presumably the Argives carried out their intention ὅπως σφίσιν ἡγεμὼν γένηται. As Thucydides says, with a vivid present tense and a strong hiatus for emphasis,[1] καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ παντὸς ξυμμαχικοῦ αἱροῦνται Δημοσθένη μετὰ τῶν σφετέρων στρατηγῶν : they elected him not to be 'commander-in-chief together with the Acarnanian, Amphilochian, and Argive generals', which is nonsensical, but to be one of the board of generals and to hold a position of prestige on the board and in the field. This is in fact what happened. The Athenian ships operated separately at sea (Th. 3. 109. 1 and 112. 7), and they remained separate from Demosthenes in matters of policy and booty (Th. 3. 113. 6 and 114. 1–2).[2] In the operations on land Demosthenes, once elected ἡγεμών, led the allied army forward and in the ensuing action held the right-hand position in the line (Th. 3. 107. 3 ὁ δὲ προσαγαγὼν ἐγγὺς τῆς "Ολπης . . .; 3. 107. 4 ἦσαν ἐς χεῖρας, Δημοσθένης μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων μετὰ Μεσσηνίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγων, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο Ἀκαρνᾶνες ὡς ἕκαστοι τεταγμένοι ἐπεῖχον, καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων οἱ παρόντες ἀκοντισταί) ; but the decisions taken by the command were made by 'Demosthenes and his fellow generals' (Th. 3. 109. 1 Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαρνάνων στρατηγοῖς; 109. 2 Δημοσθένης μετὰ τῶν ξυστρατήγων; 110. 1 τῷ Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαρνᾶσιν). It is clear from these three cases that a man can be a ἡγεμών and not a στρατηγός (as in 490 B.C.) ; or a στρατηγός and not a ἡγεμών, as the Acarnanian generals were in 426 B.C.; or a στρατηγός and a ἡγεμών, as Demosthenes was in 426 B.C.; or indeed the only στρατηγός and a ἡγεμών as well, as Gelon wanted to be (Hdt. 7. 158. 5).

The part which Callimachus played in breaking the stalemate between the

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[1] For Thucydides' use of hiatus see D. H. *Comp.* 12, of vivid tenses see Longinus 25, and in general see my article in *C.Q.* N.S. ii. 129.

[2] Gomme's suggestion, that the men referred to in Thucydides' words Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγων at 3. 107. 4 'must be hoplites, not archers, and very likely the epibatai from the twenty ships', seems to rest upon a misunderstanding of the situation. His remark 'that only hoplites are in question here, in

the regular line of battle' overlooks the mention of the ἀκοντισταί in the line of battle. His proposal to transfer the marines from the fleet to the land forces would not only weaken the twenty ships which lay within sight of the Ambracian fleet but would also cross the lines of command, since Aristotle and Hierophon commanded the Athenian ships, not Demosthenes.

groups of generals at Marathon raises some problems. The polemarch did not sit initially on the council of generals. But when the deadlock occurred, with five votes against and five votes for the motion to engage, and when 'the worse course was prevailing' (presumably because the motion lapsed if it did not command a majority vote), Miltiades went to the polemarch and brought him into the council, whereupon he voted for engagement and carried the day. Two explanations of this procedure can be offered: either the Athenians, anticipating such a possibility (perhaps in 501/0 B.C.), had conferred upon the polemarch a casting vote, such an eleventh vote being relevant *only* in the event of the council of ten generals reaching a stalemate; or, as an exceptional measure, the generals at Marathon decided to overcome the deadlock by calling in the polemarch on their own initiative. As between these two explanations we have the words of Herodotus 6. 109. 2 to guide us.

> ὡς δὲ δίχα τε ἐγένοντο καὶ ἐνίκα ἡ χείρων τῶν γνωμέων, ἐνθαῦτα, ἦν γὰρ ἐνδέκατος ψηφιδοφόρος ὁ τῷ κυάμῳ λαχὼν Ἀθηναίων πολεμαρχέειν (τὸ παλαιὸν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁμόψηφον τὸν πολέμαρχον ἐποιεῦντο τοῖσι στρατηγοῖσι), ἦν δὲ τότε πολέμαρχος Καλλίμαχος Ἀφιδναῖος, πρὸς τοῦτον ἐλθὼν Μιλτιάδης ἔλεγε τάδε.

Those who are familiar with the idiom of Herodotean expression will see at once that we have here a parenthesis within a parenthesis.[1] We may rearrange the thought in our normal sequence as follows. At that point (ἐνθαῦτα) Miltiades went to Callimachus; he went because the polemarch of the Athenians was the eleventh voter and on this occasion the polemarch was Callimachus of Aphidna; and the polemarch was the eleventh voter because in early times the Athenians continually made the polemarch equal in vote to the generals. It seems to me that Herodotus' words indicate a regular power vested in the polemarch and not an exceptional power exercised only on this occasion by Callimachus, so that we should conclude that under the law in and before 490 B.C. the polemarch had a casting vote but only when five votes having been cast against five votes made an eleventh vote significant (otherwise an eleventh vote is pointless). It seems likely, of course, that this law operative in and before 490 B.C. was passed in 501/0 B.C., when the position of the polemarch *vis-à-vis* the ten generals was regulated according to *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2. The digression τὸ παλαιὸν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁμόψηφον τὸν πολέμαρχον ἐποιεῦντο τοῖσι στρατηγοῖσι within the digression is usually taken to refer to the same time, that is to the τότε of the next sentence, 490 B.C., in which case there is no distinction between ψηφιδοφόρος and ὁμόψηφος and the meaning of ὁμόψηφος has to be restricted to that of a casting vote only. If this view is taken—and there is one case where Herodotus uses τὸ παλαιόν to mean at the time of the context and before that time (3. 58. 2 τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν ἅπασαι αἱ νέες ἦσαν μιλτηλιφέες)—it does not conflict with my view of the polemarch's role in the period from 501/0 to 490 B.C. But my acquaintance with the style of Herodotus leads me to a different interpretation. The digression within the digression indicates that τὸ παλαιόν is written in relation to τότε and means 'in earlier times than then', i.e. before but not in 490 B.C. and preceding years; the imperfect tense then refers to a past practice, which probably antedated the regulations of 501/0 B.C. Again the word ὁμόψηφος is not of course identical with ἐνδέκατος ψηφιδοφόρος. The meaning rather is that Miltiades went to Callimachus in 490 B.C. because

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[1] I have commented on this idiom in *JHS* lxx. 53 and *C.Q.*N.S. vi. 124 f.

at that period the polemarch had a casting vote, namely the eleventh vote, and the polemarch in 490 B.C. was Callimachus; and the polemarch had a casting vote in and before 490 B.C. because in still earlier times the Athenian practice had been to make the polemarch equal in vote with the generals. I take ὁμόψηφος to mean equal in vote in all respects and probably to include an equal exercise of military command, because this is the meaning of the word in Herodotus 7. 149, when Sparta offered to make the king of Argos ὁμόψηφος with the two kings of Sparta, that is to make him one of three commanders equal in all respects. If I am correct, Herodotus is referring to the position which obtained before 501/0 B.C., and τὸ παλαιόν thus marks a different stage in the history of the polemarch's powers. And apart from the passage at 3. 58. 2 which is mentioned above, Herodotus always uses τὸ παλαιόν to refer to a period anterior to the context. Moreover, in practice τὸ παλαιόν is always anterior to 500 B.C.[1]

The conclusions then to which a study of *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2 and Herodotus' account of the Marathon campaign leads us are the following. In the years before 501/0 B.C. the archon polemarchus had equal powers of deliberation and command with the στρατηγοί (their number being unknown to us) and the position of ἡγεμών. In 501/0 B.C. and until at least 490/489 B.C. the archon polemarchus lost his power of command and his regular power of deliberation, these two functions being confined to the ten generals. In 501/0 B.C. and until at least 490/489 B.C. the archon polemarchus retained a ceremonial and military position as ἡγεμὼν τῆς ἁπάσης στρατιᾶς, and in the event of a deadlock occurring in the council of generals he exercised a casting vote as ἑνδέκατος ψηφιδοφόρος. In and after 501/0 B.C. the ten generals, elected one from each tribe, were absolutely equal with one another in deliberation and in operational command, and we see in this the principle of equality which gave the Cleisthenic state its characteristic qualities of ἰσονομία, ἰσοκρατία, and ἰσηγορία.

B. τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡγεμονίας (Th. 5. 47. 7)

The study of the στρατηγία has been bedevilled by the modern preconceptions that a board of ten generals as magistrates must have a 'Vorsitzer' or 'chairman' preferably with a casting or double vote, and that a group of generals as commanders on a campaign must have an 'Oberbefehlshaber' or 'supreme commander',[2] and by the failure to distinguish between the systems of command when Athenian forces were operating alone and when Athenian forces were part of a larger group.[3] There is no need to saddle Herodotus with

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[1] Herodotus uses τὸ παλαιόν of prehistoric times at 1. 171. 2; 1. 173. 1 and 2; 7. 59. 2; 7. 89. 2; 7. 91; 7. 129. 1; 7. 176. 3 and 8. 31; of the dark age or the early archaic period at 4. 11. 1, 5. 88. 1, and 7. 59. 2; of the earliest period at Naucratis probably *c.* 615–610 B.C. rather than *c.* 566/5 B.C. (see R. M. Cook in *JHS* lvii (1937), 231, who noted the difficulty of taking τὸ παλαιόν to refer to Amasis' reign and thought Herodotus likely to have known the early history of Naucratis); and of the Samian attack on Siphnos *c.* 525 B.C. It appears then that he used τὸ παλαιόν, as Aristotle later used ἀρχαῖος (see

T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* 57 n. 4), to apply to the sixth century or earlier. If τὸ παλαιόν at 6. 109. 2 does mean 490 B.C., it is unique. In fact Herodotus writing of the Persian Wars as his main theme thinks of the wars as near-contemporary and not as 'in the old days'.

[2] See p. 112, n. 1 above and V. Ehrenberg *A.J.P.* lxvi (1945) 116 f.

[3] In consequence some writers limit the study of a system of command to the latter part of the fifth century (e.g. Ehrenberg, loc. cit. 132 simply says with reference to the period before 440 B.C. 'it cannot be decided

these modern preconceptions. He makes it clear that all ten generals held command over the army at Marathon; that there was no supreme commander among them; and that the ten generals were equal in deliberation and in voting. There are of course limits to total and simultaneous equality in action; it is obvious, for example, that chaos would ensue if ten men were to shout out orders simultaneously at the start of a battle. Accordingly on a given day one man must hold operational command. But which one? As we should expect from the Athenian concept of equality, and as Herodotus indeed states, each general holds the operational command in turn, a day at a time (ὡς ἑκάστου ἐγίνετο πρυτανηίη τῆς ἡμέρης Hdt. 6. 110) and the rotation was determined probably not by any batting order among the generals, but either by the lot or by the tribal order. Nor was the system of rotation peculiar to Athens. When Argos made her offer to share command of the Greek army equally with Sparta ἡγεόμενοι κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ πάσης τῆς συμμαχίης (Hdt. 7. 147. 4), she intended not that each should command half the allied force but that each in turn should command the whole allied force (πάσης τῆς συμμαχίης), the general policy having been, of course, decided in advance of each day of operational command. When Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis made a military alliance in 420 B.C., the principle of equality of operational command on a joint expedition was stated (Th. 5. 47. 7 τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡγεμονίας μετεῖναι ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν). We probably see such a principle put into practice at the battle of the Nemea river in 394 B.C., which occurred when the Boeotians held the operational command in their turn (X. HG 4. 2. 18). The situation which arose at Marathon was not unlike that which occurred later at Delium. There was a division of opinion at Delium between the Boeotarchs; on the day on which Pagondas held the ἡγεμονία (Th. 4. 91, resembling Herodotus' word πρυτανηίη in meaning), he addressed the troops, *persuaded* them to attack the Athenians (ἔπειθε and ἔπεισε, 91 and 93. 1), and led them to the field of battle (ἦγε τὸν στρατόν).[1]

The rotating of command was only one method of ensuring equality among the generals. When a force had to be divided, the lot decided which general

whether the election ἐξ ἁπάντων was known before Pericles' rule, but it is not likely') or discuss the position, for instance, of Themistocles at Salamis as if it concerned Athens alone.

[1] Like many others, Gomme, op. cit. 3. 560 takes *hegemonia* to mean being president or chairman of a board ('presidency of the board of boiotarchai changed regularly'); but the Greek verb for this is ἐπιστατεῖν and not ἡγεῖσθαι (cf. Th. 4. 118. 11). He doubts whether the change of *hegemonia* was made daily and between all eleven boiotarchs; here we must be guided by the analogies of daily rotation, such as the cases of Marathon and the Nemea river and at sea at Arginusae and Aegospotami (D.S. 13. 97. 6 and 13. 106. 1 ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν), and by the analogies of equality of function among members of a board, an idea of equality which was inherent also in the Boeotian system of rotating *boulai*. In the naval battles

the *hegemon* should be thought of as the flag-officer of the day, who made the signals and led the formation. A one-day *hegemonia* is not a matter of supreme command, though the words are often mistranslated so (e.g. in the Loeb edition of D.S. 13. 97. 6 ὃς ἐπὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν 'who held the supreme command that day'). The *hegemon* of the day was normally stationed on the right wing, as in a land battle; D.S. 13. 97. 6 refers apparently to the day before the battle when Thrasyllus (mistakenly Thrasybulus in the text) was flag-officer, and on the day of the battle according to Xenophon, *HG* 1. 6. 30, the right-wing officer was Protomachus and Thrasyllus came next to him. The dispositions in Diodorus differ from those in Xenophon; he puts Thrasyllus on the right wing. See Dover, loc. cit. 71 on *hegemonia* at Arginusae and Aegospotami, and Jameson, loc. cit. 80.

should command which part: for instance, on the way to Syracuse (Th. 6. 42. 1 τρία μέρη νείμαντες ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐκλήρωσαν), in Sicily after the departure of Alcibiades (Th. 6. 62. 1 δύο μέρη ποιήσαντες τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ λαχὼν ἑκάτερος), and at Samos (Th. 8. 30. 2 λαχόντες). The equality between the three commanders in Sicily is clear not only from these two passages in Thucydides but also from passages in Plutarch *Nicias*, which have sometimes been mis-understood. When the expedition was approved (Th. 6. 8. 2), the Athenians voted to send 60 ships to Sicily and three στρατηγοὺς αὐτοκράτορας (all three being equally αὐτοκράτορες). Now which of the three was first elected to this mission?[1] One must have been; and that one was Nicias according to Plutarch *Nicias* 12. 4 μετὰ τὸ ψηφίσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον Ἀθηναίους καὶ στρατηγὸν ἑλέσθαι πρῶτον ἐκεῖνον μετὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ Λαμάχου. Arriving in Sicily they each put up their own plan of operations and the decision went on a majority vote (Th. 6. 50. 1). When Alcibiades left, a disagreement between the two generals could not be so decided and it was the prestige of Nicias which counted, as Plutarch stresses on two occasions (14. 4 δύναμις and 15. 2 μέγας . . . ὄγκος). The position is neatly expressed in Plutarch *Nicias* 14. 4 (Nicias being the subject) Ἀλκιβιάδην Ἀθηναίων μεταπεμψαμένων εἰς κρίσιν λόγῳ μὲν ἀποδεχθεὶς δεύτερος ἡγεμών, δυνάμει δὲ μόνος ὤν. 'When Alcibiades was summoned for trial, Nicias became in effect sole commander by virtue of his prestige although in name he was one of two appointed commanders.' The use of δεύτερος is exactly like the use of τρίτος, πέμπτος, or δέκατος, the words indicating that a man is one of three, five, or ten persons. We find δεύτερος so used in Herodotus 4. 113. 3 when the two young men found the two Amazons waiting for them (καὶ τὴν Ἀμαζόνα εὗρε δευτέρην αὐτὴν ὑπομένουσαν).[2]

The conferment of equal powers did not always result in equality on a campaign. We can see this clearly in Sicily. After the recall of Alcibiades Nicias carried more weight (Plutarch supplies the reasons), he overbore Lamachus repeatedly (ἄγων ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ), and in consequence he had all the power (τὸ πᾶν κράτος) not *de iure* but by force of personality, as Queen Atossa had at the court of Persia (Hdt. 7. 3. 4 ἡ γὰρ Ἄτοσσα εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος).[3] When Lamachus fell in battle, Nicias was left as the only general; for there was no system of promotion in the field from taxiarchos to strategos. It was only later that the Athenian people appointed two of Nicias' officers to be his col-leagues as generals (Th. 7. 16. 1) and elected two others at home to go out

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[1] The election was a χειροτονία (Plu. *Nicias* 12. 5). Presumably someone nomi-nated X and a show of hands voted him in or out; then Y; then Z and so on to the re-quired number.

[2] The contrast between δεύτερος and μόνος is as in Aeschin. 2. 178 δέκατος δ' αὐτὸς πρεσβεύσας μόνος τὰς εὐθύνας δίδωμι. Plutarch does not use αὐτός in the phrase δεύτερος ἡγεμών because the emphasis contained in αὐτός is unnecessary; for the same reason it does not occur in Hdt. 6. 103. 1 ἦγον δέ σφεας στρατηγοὶ δέκα, τῶν ὁ δέκατος ἦν Μιλτιάδης. The meaning 'one of two' is contained in δεύτερος. However, Dover, loc. cit. 73 takes Plutarch to say that Nicias was elected com-mander of the expedition (στρατηγὸν ἑλέσθαι

πρῶτον ἐκεῖνον) and then that Nicias had been appointed second-in-command ἀπο-δεχθεὶς δεύτερος ἡγεμών. This involves Plutarch in an absurd inconsistency within the space of a couple of chapters. Dover thinks Plutarch committed the inconsistency open-eyed 'for dramatic effect'. My opinion of Plutarch is different. The translators of Plutarch's *Lives* in 1880, A. Stewart and G. Long, seem to me to have understood Plutarch's meaning correctly: 'Nikias, who was nominally Lamachus' colleague, but really absolute'. See also the discussion by Jameson, loc. cit. 83 f.

[3] See W. Kierdorf, *Erlebnis und Darstellung der Perserkriege* (1966), 63 f. on this passage.

and be further colleagues. Even within this group of five equal generals the prestige of Nicias exercised a baneful influence.[1]

It is important to notice that for many missions involving only their own forces the Athenians appointed only one general. It has been suggested that when Herodotus or Thucydides says that one general was appointed he really means more than one but fails to mention the others.[2] If such a failure occurred only once or only in back-references, as at Th. 6. 31. 2 μετὰ Ἅγνωνος (cf. 2. 58. 1), it would be understandable. But otherwise it would be a most obscure use of language. I prefer to suppose that Herodotus and Thucydides meant what they said. The instances in which one general was appointed to a mission with Athenian troops are very numerous. I note, for example, Melanthius (Hdt. 5. 97. 2 ἄνδρα τῶν ἀστῶν ἐόντα τὰ πάντα δόκιμον); Miltiades (6. 132); Leocrates (Th. 1. 105. 2); Myronides twice (Th. 1. 105. 4 and 1. 108. 2); Tolmides (Th. 1. 108. 5); Pericles twice (Th. 1. 111. 2; 1. 114. 3; 2. 31. 1); Cleopompus (Th. 2. 26. 1); Nicias thrice (Th. 3. 51. 1; 3. 91. 1; 5. 83. 4); Phormio thrice (Th. 1. 64. 2; 2. 68. 7; 2. 69. 1); Melesander (Th. 2. 69. 2); Asopius (Th. 3. 7. 1); Paches (Th. 3. 18. 3); Nicostratus (Th. 3. 75); Eurymedon (Th. 3. 80. 2); Simonides (Th. 4. 7); Aristides (Th. 5. 50. 1); Alcibiades twice (Th. 5. 52. 2; 5. 55. 4); Euetion (Th. 7. 9); and Thymochares (Th. 8. 95. 2). In three cases the reason for the choice of the one general is given; Melanthius was held in high esteem by his fellow Athenians, and Miltiades even more so (καὶ πρότερον εὐδοκιμέων . . . τότε μᾶλλον αὔξετο); and Asopius, being a relative of Phormio, met the conditions which the Acarnanians had requested. The practice of having one general was much in use in the Archidamian War, and the two outstanding cases in which one general commanded a large force more

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[1] I disagree here with K. J. Dover in his edition of Thucydides VII (1965), p. 12. He distinguishes between the three 'full' generals and the two generals who were appointed mid year when they were at Syracuse, and he considers that the latter held 'temporary and local military command' and were associated with the 'full' generals (when Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived) at the discretion of the 'full' generals. This distinction is not borne out by the instance of Cleon appointed mid year and his relationship to the 'full' general Demosthenes (Th. 4. 29. 1). The sentence at Th. 7. 16. 1 ἕως ἂν ἕτεροι ξυνάρχοντες αἱρεθέντες ἀφίκωνται 'until the arrival of other fellow-commanders duly elected' is not, I think, a restrictive condition of the election of Menander and Euthydemus but an explanation of its purpose that in the interim Nicias should not be alone in his illness and distress. The normal practice, I imagine, was to elect a man general until the end of the year and not to supersede him except for misconduct. In practice too Menander and Euthydemus are ξυνάρχοντες after the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon. Thus at 7. 43. 1 Demosthenes persuades τόν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάρχοντας, where the plural τοὺς ἄλλους refers to

Eurymedon, Euthydemus, and Menander; and at 7. 69. 4 Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus embarked as στρατηγοί for the last naval battle. The report of the attitudes of Demosthenes, Eurymedon, and Nicias to withdrawal at 7. 49 is inconclusive; for the *argumentum ex silentio*, that Euthydemus and Menander were not present because their attitudes are not reported, is not a valid one. It is in fact likely that Menander was present and gave Thucydides the report of the generals' meeting, if, as is generally supposed, Menander survived to serve at Aegospotami (X. *HG* 2. 1. 16).

[2] So Dover, loc. cit. 64, 'VI. By naming one member and making no mention of the rest' and '(iii) its use is virtually certain in passages which describe action by a member of a board on such a scale that we cannot believe that all his colleagues were left behind with nothing to do, e.g. Th. ii. 31. 1 Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξανθίππου στρατηγοῦντος. (iv) There are many other passages which are similar to (iii) but permit a greater variety of opinion on the likelihood of action by a single member, e.g. the campaigns of Cimon mentioned in Th. 1. 98 ff.'

than once were Pericles and Nicias. There was some reason then for Nicias to be described as successful above his contemporaries in his tenures of a general-ship (πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις, Th. 5. 16. 1 and 7. 15. 2) and as a man who commanded often on his own (ἦν μὲν ἔν τινι λόγῳ καὶ Περικλέους ζῶντος ὥστε κἀκείνῳ συστρατηγῆσαι καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἄρξαι πολλάκις, Plu. Nic. 2. 2).

In the period after the Persian Wars, whether one or more generals were elected to a particular mission, the Assembly laid down the main lines within which action was to be taken (cf. Th. 1. 45. 3 and 1. 49. 4). This applied even if the Assembly made the generals αὐτοκράτορες (cf. Th. 6. 8. 2); for they did not become either absolute in powers or exempt from accountability, ἀνεύθυνοι. Rather they were exempted from only some of the checks normally imposed by the constitution. In an unusual case, such as the second vote which authorized the expedition to Sicily, the exemptions were very great: Th. 6. 26. 1 ἐψηφί-σαντο εὐθὺς αὐτοκράτορας εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς πλήθους καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πλοῦ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς πράσσειν ᾗ ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ ἄριστα εἶναι and Plu. Nicias 12.6 (Plutarch, giving information not in Thucydides' account, was clearly using an inscription,[1] as he said in Chapter 1 that he would be doing), Δημόστρατος . . . ψήφισμα γράψας ὅπως αὐτοκράτορες ὦσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ κἀνταῦθα κἀκεῖ βουλευόμενοι καὶ πράττοντες. The occasions on which one general only was appointed to a mission with large forces close to Athens are themselves examples of an exemption from the normal constitutional check of collegiate office in the actual command.[2] Pericles was given sole command against Euboea in 446 B.C. (Th. 1. 114. 3) and against Megara πανδημεί in 431 B.C. (Th. 2. 31. 1). Moreover, in the latter year it is clear that he was given sole command of the defence of Attica and in that capacity did not call an assembly despite popular agitation: Th. 2. 21. 3 ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι . . . Περικλῆς δὲ . . . ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα . . . τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε. He acted στρατηγὸς ὢν on his own authority, trusting in his own judgement, and it was he who sent out the Athenian and the Thessalian cavalry who engaged the Boeotian cavalry.[3]

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[1] Schwahn 1079 seems to me mistaken in supposing that Plutarch's use of στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ is 'mit Rücksicht auf römische Verhältnisse gewählt'. Cf. Dover, loc. cit. 73.

[2] They are, of course, not examples of an 'Oberkommando' as Schwahn 1080 sup-poses, citing Syll.² 192 = Tod, GHI no. 156 (357/6): ἑλέσθαι στρατηγὸν ἐκ τῶν κεχειρο-τονημένων. The Assembly chose one or more generals from the duly elected board of generals to undertake a particular mission (in this case τὸν δ᾽ αἱρεθέντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι [Ἄνδρον]); those not chosen stayed at home or were sent on other missions. We see a similar case in 446 B.C., when Pericles went as general with the force to Euboea (Th. 1. 114. 1) and Andocides went as general with another force to the Megarid (this being the usual interpretation of IG i². 1085 = Tod, GHI no. 41). As Jameson 64 puts it, 'the archairesiai and psephismata assigning a command were complementary but separate steps'.

² The supposition that Pericles was chosen

by the Assembly to conduct the defence of Attica does away with the need to suppose either that 'Pericles speaks for the whole body of strategoi' or that 'Pericles, though with no special legal powers, yet by his in-fluence prevailed with the boule (and his fellow strategoi) not to call the normal ekklesia' (Gomme ii. 76; cf. Hignett 246 f.). When the invasion was impending, the Assembly had to appoint one or more strategi to conduct the defence, including a στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας if the provision in Ath. Pol. 61. 1 was then in force (see p. 142, below), and grant some exemptions from normal procedures under emergency condi-tions, so that he or they were αὐτοκράτορες in the fifth-century sense. Political justice pointed to Pericles as promoter of the policy which had precipitated the invasion (cf. Th. 2. 59. 2). In Tod, GHI no. 42 ll. 76–78 'the generals' are made responsible for the defence of Euboea (446/5 B.C.).

[3] In 430 B.C. we find a similar situation:

On the other hand there are only two cases in Herodotus and Thucydides when all ten generals were appointed to a specific mission. One was to defend Attica at Marathon. The other was to crush Samos in 440 B.C. (Th. 1. 116. 1), at a time when Athens was at peace elsewhere. I have not noticed in these authors the appointment of more than five generals for any specific mission otherwise, and even five is rare (Th. 1. 61. 1; 3. 19; and in the final stage at Syracuse). Three generals are quite frequent (Th. 1. 45. 2; 2. 23. 2; 2. 70. 1; 2. 79; 3. 3. 2; 4. 2. 2; 4. 42 with allies present; 4. 53; 4. 75; 6. 8. 2; 8. 25. 1 with allies present). Two generals are almost as frequent (Th. 3. 86; 3. 91. 1; 3. 91. 4; 4. 66. 3; 4. 104. 4; 4. 129. 2; 5. 61; 5. 74. 3; 5. 84. 3; 7. 20). But all the appointments of two, three, and five generals taken together are not so numerous as the appointments of one general for a specific mission in the events recorded by Herodotus and Thucydides. Indeed the choice of one general may be said to have been the norm until the tendency to appoint more than one grew in the Archidamian War and established itself in the Decelean War. When this has been realized, the famous inscription which records the preliminaries to the Athenian expedition to Sicily becomes intelligible (*IG* 1². 98 = Tod, *GHI* no. 77):

[διαχειροτονῆσαι δὲ τὸν δῆμο]ν αὐτίκα μάλα, εἴτε δοκεῖ ἕνα στρατ[ηγὸν αὐτο-κράτορα εἴτε τρεῖς] ἑλέσθαι τύχηι ἀγαθῆι νυνί, ὅιτινε[ς κτλ.

Whatever words are restored (and it may be doubted whether αὐτοκράτορα is correct, because the number is at issue and not the powers which might need separate definition), it is clear that a decision had to be taken at once whether the people's will was to elect *one* or more generals. This may have been a standard procedure, inherited from the time when one general was the norm or at least very common; or it may have been a particular procedure in this case when a large expedition of sixty Athenian ships (these had already been approved as the inscription goes on to show) was being sent so far away in a period of cold war. In either event it is clear that one commander was the first alternative stated. We, knowing the sequel, can see that the better choice would have been one commander, and that the failure to choose one was due to that distrust of their leaders which had increased after the death of Pericles and was one reason for Athens' total defeat.

C. Current Ideas on the Modern Term στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων

The expression στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων, which is made up from *Ath. Pol.* 61. 1 χειροτονοῦσι δὲ . . . στρατηγοὺς δέκα πρότερον μὲν ἀφ' ⟨ἑκάστης⟩ φυλῆς ἕνα, νῦν δ' ἐξ ἁπάντων, is a convenient way of indicating that one general was elected

Pericles στρατηγὸς ὢν took the same line when the enemy invaded Athens (Th. 2. 55. 2), and he also took countermeasures, namely the expedition to Epidaurus. Pericles alone is responsible. Later in the summer the forces which he used were taken over by two of his colleagues on the board of strategi, Hagnon and Cleopompus, who sailed off to Potidaea (Ἅγνων . . . καὶ Κλεόπομπος . . . ξυστράτηγοι ὄντες Περικλέους, λαβόντες τὴν στρατιὰν ἧπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐχρήσατο ἐστράτευσαν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας, Th. 2. 58. 1). Gomme, in his *Commentary*

ii. 165, is correct when he says 'this—ξυστράτηγοι ὄντες Περικλέους—implies not only that they had been elected at the same time as Pericles', but I see no justification for his further words 'but probably that they had also been his colleagues on the previous expedition'. Thucydides could not have made his meaning clearer: Pericles στρατηγὸς ὢν 'on the one hand' acted as before and 'on the other hand' put to sea with 100 ships [not indeed στρατηγὸς ὢν τρίτος αὐτός], and the two generals took over the forces which *he* had used [not which they had used].

from the entire citizen body without reference to tribal representation. It is not used by the ancient sources for the fifth century.[1] Its application by modern scholars has been almost entirely limited to Pericles; for when he and another general of the same tribe appear on lists of generals, it has been assumed that Pericles was στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων and his colleague was στρατηγὸς ἀπὸ φυλῆς. On this assumption many hypotheses have been created. Hignett summarizes some of them: no tribe supplied more than two generals in a single year, only one tribe at a time provided two generals, and nine tribes at least were represented in any year.[2] And what of the unrepresented tribe? How was it chosen? Wade-Gery produced a hypothesis that the tribal strategi were elected one from each tribe by the whole Demos and the one with the fewest votes was dropped. And why did the Athenians invent this elaborate system? 'The election of one of the ten generals without reference to the tribes', wrote Hignett, expressing the *communis opinio*, 'was an innovation introduced during the ascendancy of Perikles to overcome the difficulty created by his continuous tenure of the strategia for several years.'[3] And did the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων have special powers? 'The prevailing opinion', wrote Jacoby,[4] 'is that one of the ten strategoi had a higher position, was in fact the commander-in-chief, and that this "supreme strategos" was elected ἐξ ἁπάντων Ἀθηναίων, in consequence whereof one of the ten tribes remained without a representative.' Needless to say, it is assumed that the 'first strategos'[5] was Pericles 'during fifteen successive years'.

I take these assumptions in the reverse order. The belief that Pericles' ascendancy was connected with his tenure of a strategia in fifteen successive years comes from Plutarch, *Pericles* 16. 3. Plutarch has described the eminence of Pericles in the days of Ephialtes, Leocrates, Myronides, Cimon, Tolmides, and Thucydides, that is from *c.* 462 to 443 B.C., and he contrasts with it the period of 15 years after 443 B.C. μετὰ τὴν Θουκυδίδου κατάλυσιν καὶ τὸν ὀστρα-κισμόν, οὐκ ἐλάττω τῶν πεντεκαίδεκα ἐτῶν διηνεκῆ καὶ μίαν οὖσαν ἐν ταῖς ἐνιαυσίοις στρατηγίαις ἀρχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν κτησάμενος ἐφύλαξεν ἑαυτὸν ἀνάλωτον ὑπὸ χρημάτων. 'After the overthrow and ostracism of Thucydides he won a supremacy and dominance which for not less than fifteen years (viz. the Attic years 444/3-430/29 and the months of 429/8 until his death) were unbroken and unique among the holders of the annual *strategia*. . . .' There is no doubt that Pericles was supreme in 443-429 B.C. and that he was in successive years one of the ten strategi. But the conclusion that Pericles was 'supreme strategos' or commander-in-chief on the board of ten generals results from a logical confusion; one might as well argue that because X was the most influential professor in the Senate he was the Pro-Vice-Chancellor (or whatever is the equivalent of commander-in-chief among professors). The whole idea that any one strategos on the board of strategi had superior powers has received a severe set-back from K. J. Dover's excellent demonstration that the phrase

[1] Those who hold that the expressions following νῦν δέ in this part of the *Ath. Pol.* refer to the constitution only after 404/3 would maintain that the passage in 61. 1 rules out the election of any generals ἐξ ἁπάντων before 404/3. But the distinctions between the past practices (πρότερον μέν) and the present practices (νῦν δέ) are broad ones and do not always mention inter-mediate variations or exceptions (e.g. concerning the archons in 55. 1), which occurred between the time of Cleisthenes, for instance, and 404/3.

[2] Hignett 349.

[3] Id. 352, following the view of Wade-Gery in *C.Q.* xxiv (1930), 38.

[4] *FGrH* III B 1. 149.

[5] F. W. Lenz in *TAPA* lxxii (1941) 232.

Περικλῆς . . . στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων δέκατος αὐτός means that 'Pericles was one of ten generals at Athens' and not that 'Pericles was Commander-in-Chief of all the Athenian forces', as many scholars had supposed to be the case with re-ference to 432/1 B.C.[1] Indeed, as we have shown in Section B, it is most unlikely that any one on the board of ten strategi had superior powers by right to those of his colleagues, because the essential principle in any board of magistrates was τὸ ἴσον.

The next hypothesis, that the introduction of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων was an innovation due to Pericles' continuous tenure of the strategia,[2] is a classic example of arguing from after-knowledge, a common source of error in the study of ancient history. Thus we know now that Pericles was general for fifteen years from 443 B.C. until his death in 429 B.C., but the Athenians of 441 B.C. did not know that he was to be general successively until 429 B.C.; and yet it is in the Attic year 441/0 B.C. that we first have definite evidence of Pericles and Glaucon, men of the same tribe, being members of the board of generals. If we think consecutively and not retrospectively, we must ask the question whether the Athenians in the elections of spring 441 B.C. could have been so confident of Pericles holding successive generalships for many years in the future that they introduced a most undemocratic innovation, namely the removal of one tribe's right of representation (as if we now in spring 1967 were so confident of H. Wilson's future that we should give his constituency a second Member of Parliament and deprive, say, Wanstead of its right of representation). In fact the Athenians of spring 441 B.C. must have realized, to use Wade-Gery's phrase, that 'iteration in the generalship' had been and was likely to be 'not uncommon', that Cimon had been a serious rival to Pericles in the years before his death in 449 B.C., that the vision of disaster in 446 B.C. had come close to reality, and that 'the intensity of the party struggle' for several years had been such as to require an *ostracophoria* in 443 B.C. It seems to me that the traditional hypothesis of the *introduction* of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων in 443 B.C. and the traditional explanation of that introduction must be abandoned.[3]

The view of Wade-Gery, that the tribal strategi were elected one from each tribe by the whole Demos and the one with the fewest votes was dropped,[4]

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[1] Dover, loc. cit. 76, 'he (Thucydides) thinks it necessary not only to inform us that Pericles was general but to remind us that he was not an autocrat but a member of a board of *ten* generals. The insertion of the words δέκατος αὐτός in i. 116. 1 and ii. 13. 1 achieve this purpose.' For the earlier interpretation that δέκατος αὐτός meant commander-in-chief, see, e.g., Schwahn 1079–80, Ehrenberg in *A.J.P.* lxvi (1945), 116, Hignett 353.

[2] Wade-Gery *C.Q.* xxiv (1930), 38, 'The exceptions to the "one per Tribe" rule which meet us from 441 onwards are due, I think, to this system, whose original purpose was to allow an exceptionally eminent man like Pericles to be elected "from all Athens", and not permanently bar preferment in his own Tribe.' Hignett 352, 'the choice in any par-ticular year of a single general ἐξ ἁπάντων was simply an expedient to surmount the

difficulty created by the continuous re-election of Pericles'; see also p. 355.

[3] Wade-Gery in *JHS* lii (1932), 219 dates the introduction immediately *after* the ostra-cism of Thucydides: 'the need for both Policy and Executive to be continuous is now recognised, and Perikles enjoys henceforth a virtual principate, expressed constitu-tionally by his special position amongst the Strategoi.'

[4] In *C.Q.* xxv (1931), 89. He supported his view by taking as a possible analogy the method of selecting the Exegetae in Plato, *Laws* 759 d–e; I have argued elsewhere, in *C.Q.* ii (1952), 4 f., that his interpretation of the passage in Plato, *Laws* is not the correct one. Jameson in *TAPA* lxxxvi (1955), 66 f. sees some of the difficulties raised by Wade-Gery's view. So does Staveley in *Ancient Society and Institutions* (1966), 279, but I do not find the method he proposes any more

seems to assume that the votes of the whole Demos for each general were counted and rated as comparable. In fact the votes, so counted, were no more comparable than majorities in the constituencies in the election of Members of Parliament. Thus in a tribe where two candidates were good candidates, A and B would almost split the votes; but in a tribe in which C was the only good candidate, although himself inferior to A and B (say Pericles and Glaucon), C would have almost the entire vote. It would obviously be not only unfair but also unwise to choose your most important political and military officials by such a method. A more rational procedure would be to use a double method: first the Assembly would elect a representative for each tribe, e.g. A rather than B; then the Assembly would vote once again separately for each of the ten tribal representatives so chosen, and would cancel the election of the one who received fewest votes. Such a method no less than that proposed by Wade-Gery would reveal the batting order, as it were, of the generals, and this seems to me to be another very serious defect in the idea. The essence of the collegiate system in the Athenian boards of officials, whether archons, apodektai, agoranomoi, or whatever, was equality among those finally selected by the lot. Their rating might be known in a deme or in a tribe but not in the state.[1] If we are to suppose that one tribe had to be excluded from representation, I am sure that the Athenians would have decided its exclusion either by the lot or by the system of rotation and then would have left the relative popularity of the nine tribal strategi unknown. We have indeed an interesting parallel. Three of the nine archons had more prestige than their fellows, and all nine had more prestige than the secretary who made the number of offices up to ten for tribal representation. How did the Athenians decide which tribe should provide which? Not by a counting of votes in an election for the ten successful candidates but by a rotation of tribes: νῦν δὲ κληροῦσιν θεσμοθέτας μὲν ἐξ καὶ γραμματέα τούτοις, ἔτι δ' ἄρχοντα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ πολέμαρχον, κατὰ μέρος ἐξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς (Ath. Pol. 55. 1). The rotation may itself have been decided by lot, as it was for the tribal prytanies (Ath. Pol. 43. 2 πρυτανεύει δ' ἐν μέρει τῶν φυλῶν καθ' ὅτι ἂν λάχωσιν). I conclude, then, that if in any one year one tribe had to be unrepresented, the selection of the tribe was made by lot; and that if every year one tribe had to be unrepresented, a rotation of tribes was arranged by lot.

Hignett's summary of the generally held hypotheses was based on the belief that the number of generals was always ten, although with his usual thoroughness he conceded that 'it is just conceivable that there was a board of eleven generals in 441/0'.[2] The evidence on this point was published in 1941 by F. W. Lenz, who found that the Venice manuscript of the Scholia on Aelius Aristides had not ten but eleven names.[3] Aelius Aristides Or. 46 § 225 wrote of Pericles as

probable, nor that of S. Accame in *Riv. d. Fil.* lxiii (1935).

[1] The view of Lenz in *TAPA* lxxii (1941), 229, that 'Pericles had Glaucon elected as his proxy' and the proxy acted as commander-in-chief, if Pericles was not present, seems incompatible with Athenian democratic ideas; Jacoby, *FGrH* III B 2. 135 rejects Lenz's view.

[2] Hignett, 355.

[3] In *TAPA* lxxii (1941), 226 ff. His text is reproduced by Jacoby, *FGrH* 324 (Andro-

tion) F 38. Lenz saw another case of eleven strategi in Th. 1. 57. 6 Ἀρχεστράτου τοῦ Λυκομήδους μετ' ἄλλων δέκα στρατηγοῦντος, but the arguments for the text being unsound seem to me conclusive. In his commentary on F 38 Jacoby supported Wade-Gery's proposal that the words Λαμπίδης Πειραιεύς were alternative suggestions for the corrupt word Ἀθηναῖος in Γλαυκέτης Ἀθηναῖος; this proposal requires the corrupt word Ἀθηναῖος to have been corrupt at an early date, and it assumes

follows: οὐχ οὗτος ὁ μηδαμοῦ καθεύδειν ἐῶν, ἐπὶ μὲν Σάμῳ δέκατος αὐτὸς στρατη-
γῶν, ἀποκρύψας τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας στρατηγοὺς καὶ δείξας ὄνομα ἄλλως ὄντας.
. . . The Scholiast's comment runs: ἐπὶ μὲν Σάμῳ δέκατος αὐτὸς στρατηγῶν· τῶν
δέκα στρατηγῶν τῶν ἐν Σάμῳ τὰ ὀνόματα κατὰ Ἀνδροτίωνα (= FGrH 324 F 38).
Eleven names follow. They are in the official order of the Attic tribes, if the
emendation of Ἀθηναῖος to Ἀφιδναῖος is accepted. When Tribe V occurs in its
due place, there are two names, Pericles and Glaucon in that order. Wade-
Gery, Hignett, and others, arguing that the text of Androtion is corrupt, have
reduced the names and demotics to ten by deleting one name and one demotic
as interpolations. Now the fact that the names and the demotics are in the
official order of the tribes is almost a guarantee of their authenticity; for only
a scholarly interpolator would have inserted an additional name with the
demotic appropriate to the tribal order, and such an interpolator would not
be likely to have left the inconsistent δέκα of the scholiast unchanged. If one is
to emend at all, the logical thing is to emend δέκα to ἕνδεκα on the supposition
that at some stage in the transmission ια' became corrupted to ι'. Indeed Lenz
gives two *variae lectiones* for the following words, namely τῶν σάμῳ τὰ ὀνόματα
and τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἐν σάμῳ. Thus a corruption from ια' to ι' is a much simpler
and more acceptable explanation than the hypothetical interpolation which
Wade-Gery and others put forward. However, I prefer not to emend because
the text as it stands is intelligible, and one can accept the possibility that the
δέκα looks back to the citation δέκατος αὐτός and that the names are given for
the year 441/0 from the *Atthis* of Androtion, without the scholiast noticing the
discrepancy of number. If the text of the citation from Androtion is accepted,
then we have two points to bear in mind: that for the year 441/0 the Athenians
elected eleven generals, one from each tribe and a second man (either Pericles
or Glaucon) from one tribe, and that in the first half of 440 B.C. ten of the
eleven generals were in command of operations at Samos. There is of course no
inconsistency between these two points; for the number of generals on a cam-
paign is not the number of generals on the board of strategi in almost all cases
of which we have knowledge.[1]

tacitly that the position of the two entries in
the consecutive order of tribes Ξενοφῶν
Μελιτεύς (VII), Λαμπίδης Πειραιεύς (VIII),
Γλαυκέτης Ἀφιδναῖος (for Ἀθηναῖος) (IX),
Κλειτοφῶν Θοραιεύς (X) is accidental, being
due to an alternative suggestion for a cor-
rupt word.

[1] There have been attempts to obtain
more precise information about the position
of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων which I have
not discussed, as I believe in the existence of
such a strategus and yet do not think we can
obtain any precision in detail. Wade-Gery's
bold restoration, given *exempli gratia* but
adopted by some, of IG i². 114, lines 43–5
C.Q. xxv (1931), 89 imports all the words he
wants and leaves ὅποσ' ἂν δοκῇ—which is in
the text—unexplained. His publication and
restoration in C.P. xxvi (1931), 312, adopted
in ATL ii. 73, of the end of IG i². 50 = Hill,
*Sources for Greek History*² 306 provide an-
other example of Pericles and a fellow

tribesman being generals. H. D. Westlake in
Hermes lxxiv (1956), 110 f. and M. H.
Jameson in *TAPA* lxxxvi (1955), 70 f. have
drawn from the story in Plu. *Nicias* 15. 2 the
deduction that Nicias was chairman of a
board meeting of the *strategi*. Now the story
goes like this. When the colleagues (συν-
άρχοντες) were deliberating together in the
strategion the poet Sophocles was bidden by
Nicias to speak first ὡς πρεσβύτατος ὢν τῶν
συστρατήγων and replied ἐγὼ παλαιότατός
εἰμι, σὺ δὲ πρεσβύτατος. 'I am the greatest in
age but you are the greatest in prestige.' Now
this story is told to illustrate not any power
or form of chairmanship but the *unofficial*
prestige—ὁ ὄγκος—of Nicias which enabled
him to dominate his fellow general Lama-
chus; and the story is precisely in point
because it shows the prestige of Nicias being
stressed by his fellow general Sophocles in
a meeting of colleagues. Indeed the words
συνάρχοντες and συστρατήγων emphasize the

D. The Historical Origins of the So-called
στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων

When we consider the historical origins of the so-called στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων we must work forwards from the system of ten generals, one from each tribe, who were elected first in 501/0, and who are seen to have held equal powers of command at Marathon in 490/89. Whether Miltiades commanded the expedition against Paros in this same year 490/89 or in the following year 489/8,[1] there is no reason to suppose that he was στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων, since we have also a pre-Marathon case of one general being given command of a specific mission (Melanthius in 498 B.C.); and we have many later ones. The introduction of the lot for appointing the archons in 487/6 (*Ath. Pol.* 22. 5) reduced the prestige of the polemarch and enhanced the importance of the strategi, but the successive applications of the system of *ostracophoria* had a much more important result, namely the emergence of Themistocles as ὁ πρῶτος ἀνήρ[2] by spring 482 B.C., when it is probable that Aristides was ostracized (*Ath. Pol.* 22. 7). In the Attic year 483/2 Themistocles advised the Assembly to build a fleet; he was presumably one of the ten strategi of the year, but there is no reason to suppose that his legal powers were any greater than those of his colleagues. In autumn 481 B.C. when the representatives of a number of Greek states met to concert their resistance to Persia and there was a preliminary discussion about the command of the confederate forces, the claims of Athens were rejected and the decision was taken to entrust the command by land and sea to Sparta. It was thereby determined that Athens and the other loyalist Greek states would have to conform with the Spartan system of command for the year 480 B.C.[3]

Under the Spartan system the Lacedaemonians were led into the field and were commanded by one man, whether a king or a regent or a deputy, who enjoyed full powers: βασιλέως γὰρ ἄγοντος ὑπ' ἐκείνου πάντα ἄρχεται as Thucydides expressed it (5. 66. 3). His authority is expressed by the verb ἡγεῖσθαι (Th. 2. 10. 3, Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὅσπερ ἡγεῖτο τῆς ἐξόδου ταύτης; cf. 1. 89. 2; 1. 107. 2; 1. 114. 2; 2. 19. 1; 2. 47. 2; 2. 71. 1; 3. 1. 1; 3. 26. 2; 3. 89. 1; 4. 2. 1; 5. 33. 1; 5. 54. 1; 5. 57. 1; 7. 19. 1); otherwise the verb occurs in Thucydides comparatively rarely. When a Spartan citizen is appointed commander of a separate task force, he is described by Thucydides as ἄρχων (3. 52. 2; 4. 31. 2; 4. 38. 1; 4. 39. 2; 4. 57. 3; 4. 69. 3; 4. 123. 4; 4. 129. 3; 5. 3. 1 and 2; 5. 9. 9; 5. 51. 2; 5. 56. 1; 5. 66. 4; 6. 91. 4; 6. 93. 2;

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fact that *officially* Sophocles and Nicias were (equal) colleagues, and the joke turns on the double meaning of πρεσβύτατος, 'most august' in years and in prestige. As regards Nicias bidding Sophocles speak first, this can happen in any meeting of equals with or without a chairman; someone has to initiate, and it often takes the form of asking someone else to initiate. During the war I was with small groups of E.L.A.S. in which three men shared the command equally; there was no chairman. On one occasion we sat above Kalabáka and watched the Germans burning villages below because the three 'strategi' talked interminably, but on most occasions it worked well—and on the basis of true equality.

[1] Hdt. 6. 132 implies that the Parian expedition came at once after the victory at Marathon, that is in early summer 489; and the story of the *carte blanche* given to him, similar in kind to the story about Themistocles in Polyaenus 1. 30. 6, is more suitable to the months after the victory.

[2] Hdt. 7. 143. 1 ἦν δὲ τῶν τις Ἀθηναίων ἀνὴρ ἐς πρώτους νεωστὶ παριών, τῷ οὔνομα μὲν ἦν Θεμιστοκλέης.

[3] See my *History of Greece*[2], 225 for references.

7. 2. 2; 7. 19. 3; 8. 5. 1; 8. 8. 2; 8. 10. 2 and 4; 8. 11. 3; 8. 23. 4; 8. 24. 1;
8. 28. 5; 8. 39. 1 and 2; 8. 61. 2). When the armies of her allies come under
Spartan command, the army-commanders are described by him as ἄρχοντες
(2. 88. 1; 2. 93. 1; 3. 30. 1, Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρεσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς
στρατιᾶς; 3. 109. 2; 4. 73. 4; 7. 2. 1; 7. 19. 3 and 4). The whole system of
command is neatly summarized by Thucydides in describing the campaign of
Mantinea: 'the king, according to the law, directing every movement' and 'the
army consisting of officers under officers' (Th. 5. 66. 2–3, Ἄγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως
ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ τὸν νόμον . . . τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχον-
τες ἀρχόντων εἰσί). The chain of command stems from the king as commander-
in-chief and the next link in the chain is formed by the polemarchs (ibid.,
τοῖς μὲν πολεμάρχοις αὐτὸς φράζει τὸ δέον; cf. Hdt. 7. 173. 2). One reason
for the difference between the Spartan system and the Athenian system is that
the one served military purposes but the other served political and military
purposes together. It is significant of this difference that commanders killed in
action were replaced by pre-arranged promotion in the Spartan army, for
instance in Amphilochia and at Sphacteria (Th. 3. 109. 1 and 4. 38. 1, αὐτὸς
τρίτος ἐφηρημένος ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον εἴ τι ἐκεῖνοι πάσχοιεν) but not in the Athenian
army, for instance at Syracuse, where Alcibiades was recalled, Lamachus was
killed, and Nicias became sole commander by accident.

When Sparta held the ἡγεμονία of the Greeks against Persia (Th. 1. 18. 2, οἵ
τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν ξυμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἡγήσαντο), she employed her
own system of command. The Spartan king or regent or officer appointed to
the task was the commander-in-chief of the combined forces. He took decisions
and issued orders; he was παντὸς τοῦ στρατεύματος ἡγεόμενος (Hdt. 7. 204. 1)
and he was ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Th. 1. 94. 1). At the same time he was
the commander of the Lacedaemonian army, as we see in the cases of Leonidas
and Pausanias (Hdt. 7. 206, τοὺς ἀμφὶ Λεωνίδην πρώτους and 9. 53. 2, οἱ μὲν
ἄλλοι ἄρτιοι ἦσαν τῶν ταξιάρχων πείθεσθαι Παυσανίῃ). He had under his com-
mand the commanders of the allied contingents (e.g. Hdt. 8. 49. 1, οἱ στρατηγοὶ
ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων πολίων, at Salamis). He summoned them to attend a council
meeting and he issued his orders to them; and they reported or made requests
to him (e.g. Hdt. 9. 50). In accordance with Spartan practice and with the
logistics of an army drawn, for instance, from 24 states in the campaign of
Plataea, one officer commanded each allied contingent.[1] Thus we find one
general for the Athenians in Thessaly (Hdt. 7. 173. 2, ἐστρατήγεε . . . Ἀθηναίων
Θεμιστοκλέης ὁ Νεοκλέος), one for the Thebans (Hdt. 7. 205. 2), one for the
Thespians (Hdt. 7. 222), one for the Athenians at Artemisium (Hdt. 8. 42, τὸν
Ἀθηναίων στρατηγόν, Themistocles; Hdt. 8. 22. 1, he selects the fastest ships
from the Athenian fleet), one for the Corinthians at Artemisium (Hdt. 8. 5. 1, ὁ
Κορίνθιος στρατηγός, Adeimantus), one for the Athenians at Salamis (Hdt.
8. 75. 2 and 8. 110. 3, στρατηγὸς ὁ Ἀθηναίων, Themistocles), one for the Corin-
thians at Salamis (Hdt. 8. 59, ὁ Κορίνθιος στρατηγός, Adeimantus), one for the
Athenians at Plataea (Hdt. 9. 28. 6, Ἀθηναῖοι . . . ὀκτακισχίλιοι· ἐστρατήγεε δ'
αὐτῶν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου), one for the Athenians at Aegina (Hdt. 8. 131. 3,
Ἀθηναίων δὲ ἐστρατήγεε Ξάνθιππος ὁ Ἀρίφρονος) and at Sestos (Hdt. 9. 114. 2

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[1] In case it is argued here that Herodotus
names one general but means the board of
generals, we may note that, if Pausanias had
had to consult ten Athenian generals, five
(as in Th. 1. 29. 2 and 1. 46. 2) or more
Corinthian generals, and so on for 24 states
in all, he would have had to deal with and
issue orders to well over 100 generals!

and 120. 4, Xanthippus), and one for the Athenians in 478 B.C. (D.S. 11. 44. 2, Aristides). Each commander had two functions, to represent his state on the council of generals and to command his national contingent. We see Themistocles and Adeimantus fulfilling the former function in the debate reported by Herodotus at 8. 61. The commander's command of his national contingent was not restricted or divided. Themistocles and Adeimantus, like the Spartan king 'directing every movement' of the Spartans, selected and directed the units of their squadrons (Hdt. 8. 22. 1 and 8. 94. 3) and each sailed in his own flagship (ἡ στρατηγίς, Hdt. 8. 92. 2 and 8. 94. 1). Thus Themistocles and Adeimantus were in Spartan terminology ἄρχοντες. It is this term which Thucydides put in the mouth of the Athenian envoys at Sparta, when they emphasized Athens' contribution to victory in appointing Themistocles as her ἄρχων (Th. 1. 74. 1).

When and how was Themistocles appointed, and what position did he hold vis-à-vis the Athenian board of strategi? The allies knew in autumn 481 B.C. that each had to produce a single commander for the operations of 480 B.C. It is likely that the nominees were needed for the next meeting of the allied representatives in the spring of 480 B.C., for the nominees had to be approved at the meeting as οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατηγοί (for the term see, e.g., Hdt. 9. 50). The tenure of command for all commanders in the Greek League forces was evidently from spring to spring, as we see, for instance, in the cases of the Spartans Leotychidas and Pausanias and of the Athenians Themistocles, who commanded in Thessaly in spring or early summer 480 B.C. (Hdt. 7. 132. 2) and in the islands after the Battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8. 111–12), and Xanthippus, who commanded the Athenian squadron in spring 479 B.C. and besieged Sestos in the winter of 478 B.C. (Hdt. 8. 131 and 9. 117 f.).[1] Themistocles, then, was appointed Athenian commander before the spring meeting of 480 B.C. It is probable that the appointment was made in the seventh prytany, in late February or early March; for this is known to have been the time of the ἀρχαιρέσιαι στρατηγῶν at a later date (Ath. Pol. 44. 4). There was no need for tribal representation in the appointment. The people therefore elected him ἐξ ἁπάντων. In the years 480, 479, and 478 Athens elected what we may call στρατηγοὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων; one in 480 B.C., Themistocles; two in 479 B.C., Aristides on land and Xanthippus at sea; and one in 478 B.C., Aristides.[2]

In 480 B.C., when Themistocles was στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων, to use the modern terminology, there were the usual Athenian strategi at Athens, as we should expect and as indeed we learn from Ath. Pol. 23. 1, when Attica was being evacuated (τῶν γὰρ στρατηγῶν ἐξαπορησάντων τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ κηρυξάντων σώζειν ἕκαστον ἑαυτόν). In 479 B.C., when Aristides was in command of the Athenian army at Plataea, we hear of οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων there (Hdt. 9. 44–6); two of them are named, Leocrates and Myronides (Plu. Arist. 20. 1). In 478 B.C., when Aristides was in command of the Athenian naval squadron, we learn that Cimon served as an Athenian strategus with him in the Bosporus (Plu. Arist. 23. 1). The relationship of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων in this context to the normal στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς is best expressed by Plutarch when he

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[1] For the chronology see my note in Historia iv (1955), 384 n. 1.

[2] We do not know whether an Athenian force served under Leotychidas in northern Greece in 478 B.C.; if it did, the commander may have been Themistocles as he spoke for Athens against Sparta at a meeting of the Delphic Amphictyony in which the Medizing states were under consideration, probably in 478 B.C. (Plu. Them. 20. 2).

summarizes the conditions at Plataea.[1] Alexander of Macedon asked to see
Aristides himself (Plu. *Arist.* 15. 5); Aristides opposed the wishes of the other
Athenian generals (16. 2–3, οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων); and Aristides
'on behalf of the Athenians' approved the award of the prize of valour to
Plataea (20. 3). When Aristides was asked by Alexander to keep the message to
himself, Aristides replied that he must report it to Pausanias as commander-
in-chief: ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἀνακεῖσθαι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν (15. 5). Aristides and other
contingent-commanders in relation to the Greek League were ἡγεμόνες (15. 2).
We may conjecture either that the Athenian assembly elected one man to
command their forces under the Greek League from spring 480 B.C. to spring
479 B.C. at a separate election and then proceeded to elect the board of
strategi to take office in July 480 B.C.; or that the assembly elected a board of
strategi to take office in July 480 B.C. and then chose one of the elected persons
to command their forces under the Greek League from spring 480 B.C. to
spring 479 B.C. It seems more likely that separate elections were held; for the
appointments were entirely different in powers and in tenure. Even so, we do
not know whether Themistocles was at the same time commander of Athenian
forces from spring 480 to spring 479 B.C. *and* one of ten Athenian strategi
elected for 481/0, *and* one of ten strategi elected for 480/79. But we can see
that the Persian Wars led to the creation for the first time of a στρατηγὸς ἐξ
ἁπάντων, who exercised full and sole command of an Athenian force, who
represented his state fully and alone, and who held office for a period and with
powers different from those of the στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς.[2]

   A new situation arose in the autumn of 478 B.C. when Pausanias was recalled
and the bulk of 'the Greeks' offered the supreme command to Athens (Hdt.
8. 3. 2 and Th. 1. 96. 1). Should she continue to use the Spartan system of
command? Other, more 'democratic' systems had been tried. Until just
before the battle of Lade the Ionians had had a board of generals equal with
one another in authority and more closely dependent upon the political organ
which controlled its strategy (e.g. Hdt. 6. 7); the system had led to much
debate among the generals (Hdt. 6. 11. 1) and in the battle of Lade to much
defection. Just before the battle the Ionians had made a short-lived and
unsuccessful experiment: they appointed one general, Dionysius of Phocaea,
to be their commander-in-chief and 'entrusted themselves' to him (οἱ Ἴωνες
ἐπιτρέπουσι σφέας αὐτοὺς τῷ Διονυσίῳ).[3] Would Athens as an Ionian state
choose the earlier Ionian system of commanding a confederate force? In fact
she continued the Spartan system of command. She accepted and kept the
ἡγεμονία for herself. Aristides as her commander on the spot became successor
at once of Pausanias as commander-in-chief of 'the Greeks', as στρατηγὸς τῶν

   [1] As Herodotus tells the story, the system
of command is not brought out (9. 44 f.).

   [2] Little attention has been given hitherto
to the effect of the Persian Wars and the
Delian Confederacy on the Athenian system
of command. The usual comment is that of
Hignett 247: 'The principle of strict col-
legiality was early violated, for the needs of
the Persian War compelled the Athenians to
confer supreme authority within the board
for a whole campaign on a single general,
who then acted as the representative of

Athens on the war-council of the patriotic
Greeks.' So Busolt–Swoboda, 891 n. 2:
'Themistocles Aristeides und Xanthippos
waren 480 und 479 besonders bevollmäch-
tigte, ihren Amtsgenossen übergeordnete
Strategen.'

   [3] There is perhaps a similar implication of
unusual or excessive trust in Th. 2. 65. 4
when after their attack on Pericles the
Athenians ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὅμιλος ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν
εἵλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν.

'Ελλήνων (Th. 1. 94. 1). In this capacity he played the leading part in the formation of the Athenian Alliance (or, in modern terminology, of the Delian Confederacy) as the administrative form adopted by 'the Greeks' in their actions against Persian territory (Hdt. 8. 3. 2, διωσάμενοι τὸν Πέρσην περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἤδη τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο). He was succeeded as commander-in-chief of the combined forces by Cimon, who captured Byzantium from Pausanias during the Attic archon-year 477/6 (Plu. *Cimon* 6. 6; *FGrH* 70 Ephorus F 191, Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος; D.S. 11. 60. 2), and Eïon and Scyros during the archon-year 476/5 (Hdt. 7. 107. 1, ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου; Th. 1. 98, Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος; Plu. *Cimon* 7. 1; Scholia Aeschin. 2. 31 and Plu. *Theseus* 36. 1). Some ten years later Cimon was commander-in-chief of the combined forces at the battle of the Eurymedon River (Th. 1. 100. 1, Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων . . . Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος); and again in 450 B.C. in Cyprus (Th. 1. 112. 2, ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος). It was in his capacity as ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων and not as στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐξ ἁπάντων, to use the modern terminology, that Cimon was described by Cratinus as πάντ' ἄριστος τῶν Πανελλήνων πρόμος (Plu. *Cimon* 10. 4).

Nor was Cimon the only such commander-in-chief; for we must assume that the office was not necessarily held by him in 466–461 and that it did not lapse with his ostracism in 461 B.C. until its re-emergence in 450 B.C., but that it was held by other generals such as Leocrates, Myronides, Tolmides, Pericles, probably Ephialtes (mentioned together with Cimon as πρωτεύοντες in Plu. *Pericles* 16. 3) and Charitimides, who is mentioned twice in the conduct of the expedition in Egypt (*FGrH* 688 Ctesias F 14, §§ 26–37; Th. 1. 104. 2, αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων emphasizes its confederate character; cf. 1. 109. 1 and 1. 110. 4).

How were these outstanding commanders, these πρῶτοι ἄνδρες, to be geared to the internal system of Athens' ten στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς? Three solutions present themselves for our consideration. First, one might abolish the system of electing a στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων, such as Themistocles, and appoint from among the ten στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς one man to be commander-in-chief of 'the Greeks' for each operation. The weakness of this solution is that it would not be practicable to wait for an appointment at Athens when confederate forces might have to operate rapidly far from Athens, and it would inspire less confidence in the confederates than the appointment of a regular commander-in-chief.[1] Second, one might bring the appointment of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων and the appointment of the στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς into line in regard to the dates of tenure. It is indeed likely that this was done in 477 B.C., Aristides being continued from spring to midsummer 477 B.C. and Cimon taking office as commander-in-chief from midsummer 477 to mid-summer 476 B.C.[2] With

[1] One is apt to forget that the first ten years of the Athenian Alliance's history were full of action against Persia and are not represented at all by what Thucydides says in the Pentekontaëtia. It was not the sort of sporadic activity in which Athens would appoint now and then one or more strategi for a specific mission; and, as we have seen in the case of Eisenhower, continuity of leadership at the head of combined forces is of the first importance in terms of confidence as well as effectiveness. The Allies themselves probably continued to appoint one commander each for their own contingents, as they had done under the Spartan system; we have an example at the battle of Arginusae where the Samian contingent fought under a Samian commander, Hippeus (X. *HG* 1. 29).

[2] The prominence of Aristides in the formation of the Alliance (*Ath. Pol.* 23. 5; D.S. 11. 47) and in the critical task of

the appointments thus in line the Athenians could have elected ten strategi, namely one στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων and then, discounting his tribe, nine στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς. Under this system the commander-in-chief would be absent very frequently from the board of strategi sitting in their capacity as magistrates. Third, one might employ the second solution but with the difference that one would elect eleven strategi, namely one στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων and ten στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς.

The evidence indicates that the second and the third solutions were both employed. In spring 468 B.C. Cimon was one of the ten strategi who entered the theatre (ἀπὸ φυλῆς μιᾶς ἕκαστον, Plu. *Cimon* 8. 8), and it was Cimon who conducted the sacrifice, whether as στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν (see p. 116, above), or as στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων, or by a special vote of the people. At this time there is no doubt that he was commander-in-chief of the combined forces of the Athenian Alliance. In the year 441/0 we find the third solution in use. For the eleven generals of that year (see p. 132, above) are best explained on the ground that early in 441 B.C. Pericles had been elected στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων to be commander-in-chief of the combined forces, and that ten στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς had been elected to serve as Athenian magistrates; there were thus eleven strategi, and Pericles acted on a par with his colleagues in some functions of the strategia. The elections of early 441 B.C. took place before the revolt of Samos and Byzantium, and it is possible that the fiction of confederate forces, αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, was still being maintained at that time. But the dictatorial treatment of Samos and the reduction in the number of the autonomous states to Chios and Lesbos alone may have brought the fiction to an end. Thereafter, so far as we know, the Athenian Alliance ceased to exist as an autonomous combination of states, and the board of Athenian generals consisted of ten and not eleven generals, except perhaps in 407 B.C.

When Athens alone went to war or alone initiated a war, the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων was one of the board of generals of Athens. Thus in the war against Thasos Athens acted alone: καὶ ναυσὶ μὲν ἐπὶ Θᾶσον πλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (Th. 1. 100. 2, sandwiched between Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων in 100. 1 and αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων in 100. 3); and in the early part of the campaign we find Cimon with the naval forces (Plu. *Cimon* 14. 1–2) and Sophanes and Leagros in command of the land forces at Datum (Hdt. 9. 75; cf. Paus. 1. 29. 5).[1] Again Cimon commanded the Athenian forces which went to Sparta on two occasions (Ar. *Lysistrata* 1143, Κίμων and Th. 1. 102. 1, Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος).[2] Similarly in 440 B.C. Athens alone attacked Samos: πλεύσαντες οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Σάμον ναυσὶ τεσσαράκοντα δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν (Th. 1. 115. 2); and Pericles was involved in this first stage of the affair (Plu. *Pericles* 25. 2, πλεύσας οὖν ὁ Περικλῆς τὴν μὲν οὖσαν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐν Σάμῳ κατέλυσεν). In the second stage Athens acted alone at first and Pericles was one of ten Athenian

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assessing the resources of the allied states makes it probable that he was at work well into 477 B.C. and particularly in months when sailing was not difficult. He might thus have continued as commander until midsummer 477 B.C. On the other hand all the military operations are attributed to Cimon, and such operations must have started, one imagines, in midsummer 477 B.C. at the latest.

[1] They were evidently commanding an Athenian force which was preparing the way for the joint colony of Athenians and allies (Th. 1. 100. 2–3 Ἀθηναῖοι . . . αὐτοὶ ἐκράτησαν . . . προελθόντες δὲ . . . διεφθάρησαν). For the fragmentary casualty list *IG* i². 928 see p. 139, n. 2 and Gomme's comments, i. 297.

[2] See my arguments in *Historia* iv (1955), 377 f.

strategi on the campaign (Th. 1. 116. 1, Ἀθηναῖοι . . . τεσσαράκοντα . . . ναυσὶ καὶ τέτταρσι Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος ἐναυμάχησαν),[1] and in the succeeding Attic year 440/39 he was one of several generals in the field (Th. 1. 116–17 mentions Pericles, Thucydides, Hagnon, Phormion, Tlepolemus, and Anticles, and a casualty list probably of 440/39 gives a general called Epiteles, IG i². 928 = Tod GHI no. 48, line 4).[2]

When the Athenian Alliance ceased to exist as an autonomous combination of states, the function for which the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων had been invented came to an end. Whether this happened soon after the death of Cimon in winter 450–449 B.C. or with the attack on Samos in 440 B.C., the Athenian state had by then been accustomed for a generation to elect a στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων. It seems that it continued to do so, at least during the lifetime of Pericles; for after 441/0 there are two certain cases and three possible cases (depending on restorations) of Pericles and another man of his tribe being generals in the same year, and the simplest explanation of these cases is that the people elected Pericles στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων. It was a way of showing that Pericles was ὁ πρῶτος ἀνήρ in the democracy (Th. 2. 65. 9). After his death when the leaders were more on a level with one another we have no certain case of two generals coming from one tribe, except in the year 407 B.C.[3] Then Alcibiades was elected in absentia in February/March 407 B.C. to be one of the generals for 407/6. When he came home in May 407, he was probably voted στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν (see p. 116, above), and he then had a member of his own tribe, Adeimantus, elected as general (D.S. 13. 69. 3). It is possible that on his return home he was elected στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων in a special election and was vested with such powers of command as had been held in the past by a commander-in-chief of the confederate forces, since we are told by Xenophon that he was proclaimed at this time ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ (HG 1. 4. 20), and by Diodorus that at this time all the forces were entrusted to him by land and by sea, as they made him στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ (D.S. 13. 69. 3). If Alcibiades became στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων, then he released a tribal strategia, into which his fellow tribesman Adeimantus was elected to be general (i.e. for 407/6).[4]

E. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

In Attica, and in most other Indo-European communities, the king being the religious and political head of the state was responsible for the safety of the realm, sacrificed on its behalf in times of danger, led out its forces, and fought in a position of danger. When the functions of the kings devolved upon the magistrates (Ath. Pol. 3. 2), the archon polemarchus received these particular

[1] Athens seems to have summoned aid from Chios and Lesbos by virtue of individual treaties of alliance and not through a meeting of the Allied Congress (Th. 1. 116. 1 and 116. 2 and 117. 2).

[2] The casualty list gives allied casualties elsewhere but 'none, so far as we can tell, in Thasos or Thrace' (ATL iii. 109); this accords with the Thasian War being conducted by Athens alone and not by the Athenian Alliance. There is nothing surprising in the large number of generals used on this very critical campaign. In 433 B.C. Athens sent two groups of three generals each to Corcyra with 30 ships (Tod, GHI no. 55) and eight generals were at the battle of Arginusae (X. HG 1. 6. 29–30).

[3] Jameson 65 f. gives a list of cases where there were two generals from one tribe and discusses doubtful cases, e.g. Cleophon on pp. 86 f.

[4] For this matter see Jameson 84 f. and A. Andrewes in JHS lxxiii (1953), 3. Adeimantus goes into action at Andros (X. HG 1. 4. 21), i.e. in the Attic year 407/6.

responsibilities. At a later date, probably after the conspiracy of Cylon,[1] and before the beginning of the sixth century, the responsibility for the safety of the realm was undertaken by a board of officials, namely the *archon polemarchus* and an unknown number of στρατηγοί. At this time the *archon polemarchus* and a strategos had equal votes on the board (Hdt. 6. 109. 2, τὸ παλαιὸν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁμόψηφον τὸν πολέμαρχον ἐποιεῦντο τοῖσι στρατηγοῖσι). The strategi probably commanded forces sent on expeditions outside Attica (for instance, Alcmaeon at Crisa and Peisistratus against Megara), while the polemarch carried out his duties as a magistrate and as a military commander within Attica.

In 501/0 the system of military command was reformed in the light of Cleisthenes' new system of tribes. Military command was now vested exclusively in ten strategi, so elected annually by the people from a number of candidates presented by the tribes that one strategus came from each tribe. The *archon polemarchus*, stripped of his military command, led out the forces of the state as *hegemon* (*Ath. Pol.* 22. 2). In this capacity he carried out ceremonial duties inherited from the king such as the making of sacrifices and vows for the state, the organization of the 'Epitaphia' (the state funeral of those killed in battle), and probably the delivery of the eulogy in honour of the fallen; and he fought in a position of danger in defence of Attica. The system introduced in 501/0 is seen at work in 490 B.C. The *archon polemarchos* conducted the sacrifice and vowed on behalf of the state to Artemis Agrotera; when the battle took place at Marathon, he fought in person in the position of danger as the right-hand man of the line in accordance with 'the law at that time' (Hdt. 6. 111, ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον ἔχειν κέρας τὸ δεξιόν). He was in fact killed; otherwise it is likely that as organizer of the 'Epitaphia' he would have delivered the eulogy in honour of those who were buried where the Mound now stands. The military command at Marathon was vested in ten equal strategi or 'army-leaders' (Hdt. 6. 103. 1, ἦγον δέ σφεας στρατηγοί δέκα). Their complete equality, embodying a principle dear to the Cleisthenic system of ἰσονομία, ἰσηγορία, and ἰσοκρατία, almost led to an impasse. When a proposal was made to engage the Persians, five generals voted for and five against the motion. The proposal would have lapsed altogether, if no further action had been taken. But the *archon polemarchos* was called in to vote together with the generals, and he voted for the motion.

The decade which followed the battle of Marathon brought innovations and problems. The prestige of all the archonships was severely injured in 487/6 by a reform whereby the nine archons and their secretary were selected by lot, one from each tribe, from candidates elected by the demes (*Ath. Pol.* 22. 5). It is indeed possible that the *archon polemarchos* had been selected in this way since 501/0.[2] In any case when the choice of a man to be polemarch depended not on the people's vote but at least in part on the lot and on the need to fit in with tribal representation, it is clear that less importance would be attached to the holder of the Polemarchia and to the magistracy itself. Some devolution of its functions is to be expected in the years after 487/6. But much more

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[1] Thucydides 1. 126. 8 states that, when Cylon's supporters were holding the Acropolis, the Athenians entrusted to the nine archons τὴν φυλακήν. As this was normally a responsibility of the strategi, it seems likely that the board of strategi was not yet in existence. τότε δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἔπρασσον. Herodotus 5. 71. 2 mentions οἱ πρυτάνιες τῶν ναυκράρων as taking Cylon and his supporters from the altars.

[2] See p. 118, n. 3, above.

revolutionary was the effect of several *ostracophoriae* held in the years 487 to 482, which brought forward by repeated acts of deliberate choice by the whole people ὁ πρῶτος ἀνήρ, Themistocles, to lead the state in peace and in war. Officially, we may presume, he was one of ten equal strategi in 483/2; but the ostracism of Xanthippus in that year meant the final and complete triumph of Themistocles as the leading citizen. The major problem arose in autumn 481 B.C. Then those Greek states which had sworn to unite against Persia, having rejected the claims of Athens, charged Sparta with the supreme command of their combined forces by sea and by land. The problem was how the command of the Athenian forces was to be fitted into the Spartan system of command.

The problem was solved by Sparta in the light of her own experience with the Spartan Alliance. The states of the Greek League, Athens among them, were each to provide one commander for one year; the resulting commanders were then to form an advisory committee of generals, οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων. While each general commanded his national contingent, the Spartan commander-in-chief commanded the combined forces, making his own decisions and issuing his orders to the national commanders. The nominee of each state had presumably to be presented at the meeting of the Congress of the Greeks in the spring of 480 B.C. Athens chose her commander for the year from the whole body of the state, that is, to use a convenient abbreviation, ἐξ ἁπάντων, and the choice was Themistocles. The election was probably made soon after the decision was taken whether or not to hold an *ostracophoria*, and it therefore fell approximately in the seventh prytany, i.e. in February/March, the date at which we have later evidence that the elections of military officials were held (*Ath. Pol.* 44. 4).[1] The election of Themistocles as στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων was followed by the election of perhaps ten στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς. The ten strategi had different functions to perform and a different period of office, namely from midsummer to midsummer. The Congress of the Greeks confirmed the appointment of Themistocles in the spring as a στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, and he commanded the Athenian forces in Thessaly, at Artemisium, at Salamis, and at Naxos in the period spring 480 to spring 479. His successors were Aristides on land and Xanthippus at sea in 479/8, and Aristides at sea in 478/7, each being appointed to hold command from spring to spring. When the change of hegemony from Sparta to Athens occurred in autumn 478, Aristides became commander-in-chief of 'the Greeks' *de facto* and helped to create the new organization which came to be known as the Athenian Alliance, or in modern terminology the Delian Confederacy. There can be little doubt that Athens continued to use the Spartan system of command. One Athenian was appointed to be commander-in-chief for the year, and he controlled the combined forces of the Alliance. For the first ten years Cimon was elected to this position; he won the confidence of the Allies and he was held in high regard as πάντ᾽ ἄριστος τῶν Πανελλήνων πρόμος.

In the year of transition 478/7 it is likely that Aristides stayed in the field beyond spring 477 B.C., as he was engaged in assessing the resources of the allied states and developing the central organization, and that Athens took the

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[1] Before the discovery of the *Ath. Pol.* it was thought that the *archairesiai* were held in the ninth prytany. It is surprising that they were in fact held so early; the occasion of the Persian Wars and the need to produce a commander in the spring may have caused the date of the elections to be put in the seventh prytany.

opportunity to bring the period of office of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων into line with that of the στρατηγοὶ ἀπὸ φυλῆς. At this time too he may have been included among the ten strategi, so elected that each tribe had a representative; this was the case anyhow in 468 B.C. (Plu. *Cimon*. 8. 8). But there was no blinking the fact that the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων was the pre-eminent man, ὁ πρῶτος ἀνήρ, in the state. On the other hand, the *archon polemarchos* had lost prestige. It seems that he was stripped further of his duties. In particular a law was passed that the eulogy of those who had fallen in the Persian Wars should be delivered by a speaker chosen for the occasion (D.S. 11. 33. 3); it seems likely that under this law the polemarch came to be replaced by ὁ πρῶτος ἀνήρ, who owed his position partly to being a good speaker. Perhaps Aristides spoke late in 479 B.C.[1] The sacrifice to Dionysus at the Great Dionysia in 468 B.C. was conducted not by the polemarch but by Cimon, presumably the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων of that year. It may have been at this time or later that some functions of the polemarch were transferred to the generals. The function of leading out the hoplites was given to one general, ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, and that of defending the safety of the realm and of fighting in person in Attica was given to another general, ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας (*Ath. Pol.* 61. 1). The polemarch no longer held the right-hand position in battle at the time when Herodotus composed his account of the battle of Marathon *c.* 455–445 B.C., because he stated that 'the law then', i.e. in 490 B.C., gave the polemarch that position (6. 111. 1 ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι). The law must have been revoked in the interim. Three duties of a military kind were left with the polemarch: he remained organizer of ὁ ἐπιτάφιος ἀγών (itself first established in its classical form at the conclusion of the Persian Wars; D.S. 11. 33. 3), sacrificer to Artemis Agrotera in memory of Marathon, and maker of offerings to those fallen in war and to Harmodius and Aristogeiton (*Ath. Pol.* 58. 1). It looks as if these residual functions of the polemarch became fossilized as from this time, that is as from the Attic year 479/8.

After the battle of the Eurymedon River *c.* 467 B.C. Athens relaxed her activities against Persia (Th. 3. 10. 4) and conducted operations of her own against Thasos and in defence of Sparta. Between 466 and 461 we can see how she used her board of strategi. At least three strategi seem to have been sent to Thasos and Thrace. One of them, Cimon, was tried in court. On the other hand only one general, Cimon, was sent in command of the hoplite forces which went twice to Sparta, and it is possible that Ephialtes and Pericles each had a separate naval mission in these years (Plu. *Cimon* 13. 4). Thus one or more generals were appointed *ad hoc* to command a particular mission. It is probable that the Assembly now, as later, made each appointment by χειροτονία (e.g. Plu. *Nicias* 12. 5). Meanwhile the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων continued to be appointed year by year. In most years he was probably active as commander-in-chief of the combined forces, especially in Cyprus, Phoenicia, and Egypt, and his usefulness continued after the death of Cimon in Cyprus

[1] W. Kierdorf, *Erlebnis und Darstellung der Perserkriege* (1966), 83 f., makes a strong case in support of Diodorus against Jacoby in *JHS* lxiv (1944), 55, supported in *ATL* iii. 109–10. But he changes the date of the law from after Plataea to after 478 B.C., because he considers that the 'Tatenkatalog' of the Amazons, Adrastus, and the Heracleidae is more appropriate to the propaganda of the opening years of the Delian Confederacy. I am inclined to keep the date as in Diodorus, because the law is probably cited originally from a dated psephisma, and because the greatest occasion for the glorification of fallen patriots was in 479 rather than, say, in 475 B.C.

and probably after the conclusion of peace with Persia. Between 466 and 443 the στρατηγία ἐξ ἁπάντων was held evidently by several πρωτεύοντες—Cimon, Leocrates, Myronides, Ephialtes, Pericles, Tolmides, and Thucydides (Plu. *Pericles* 16. 3)—and then, when Thucydides had been ostracized, by Pericles for many years in succession. It is possible that during some of this time the στρατηγία ἐξ ἁπάντων was separate from the ten στρατηγίαι ἀπὸ φυλῆς. In the elections for 441/0 eleven generals were elected: of these Pericles seems to have been the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων, and the other ten were representatives of the ten tribes. The revolts of Samos and Byzantium may have ended the fiction of the Athenian Alliance (or Delian Confederacy) as a free association of states, and the post of commander-in-chief of the combined forces may have ceased in 440 B.C. The Empire was now tightly held by the dominant state, and her subjects were under the orders of Athens and the Athenian magistrates. But the practice of appointing one στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων seems to have continued during the lifetime of Pericles.[1]

We know of only one occasion later when the people wished to pay special honour to a military commander, namely to Alcibiades in 407 B.C. He led the hoplites to Eleusis as ἡγεμών either in the tradition of the polemarch or as appointed στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, and he was given command of all the forces at Athens' disposal, probably in the tradition of the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἁπάντων as commander of the combined forces of the Athenian Alliance. It was an unhappy revival of the past; and its failure revealed one of the weaknesses of the post-Periclean democracy, an inability to trust a single commander.[2]

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[1] The evidence for this lies in the presence of Pericles and a fellow tribesman on the board of strategi perhaps in 439/8 (doubtfully restored), perhaps in 435/4 (restored), certainly in 433/2 and 432/1, and probably in 431/0.

[2] Two matters which lie outside the fifth century have sometimes been used by students of the strategia and need brief discussion. The first is the phrase with which Herodotus described Cleisthenes' first reform before Isagoras called in Cleomenes: δέκα τε δὴ φυλάρχους ἀντὶ τεσσέρων ἐποίησε (5. 69. 2). Some, including LSJ⁹ s.v. II, have seen these φύλαρχοι as commanders of the cavalry provided by each tribe, and others, as noted by How and Wells ii. 36, have perceived strategi lurking 'under a strange name'. The defects of the first view are that a fully organized cavalry force, based on the new ten tribes, cannot have existed in 508/7 before Cleomenes intervened (it is doubtful if such a force existed even at the time of Marathon), and that the words of Herodotus must refer to major officials and not to subordinate commanders of one part of the armed forces. The defect of the second view is that Herodotus speaks elsewhere and often of Athenian strategi as στρατηγοί and had no reason to call this military flower by another name.

Now the sense of what Herodotus says in this passage τὰς φυλὰς μετωνόμασε καὶ ἐποίησε πλεῦνας ἐξ ἐλασσόνων. δέκα τε δὴ φυλάρχους ἀντὶ τεσσέρων ἐποίησε is paralleled in the expressions in *Ath. Pol.* 8. 3 φυλαὶ δὲ ἦσαν δ' καθάπερ πρότερον, καὶ φυλοβασιλεῖς τέτταρες and in *Ath. Pol.* 41. 2 εἰς τὰς τέτταρας συνενεμήθησαν φυλὰς καὶ τοὺς φυλοβασιλέας κατέστησαν. In each case the Greek manner is to mention first the tribes and then the major tribal official, whether he is a φύλαρχος or a φυλοβασιλεύς. I take it then that Herodotus means by φύλαρχοι at 5. 69. 2 the major tribal officials. This is indeed the general meaning of φύλαρχος, for instance, in Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 2. 14 and Arist. *Pol.* 1301ᵇ23. Herodotus then referred to the major tribal officials of the ten new tribes in 508/7 and not to military commanders of the army or of tribal contingents, as has been supposed by some and most recently by E. S. Staveley in *Ancient Society and Institutions* (1966), p. 276 and p. 284.

If, then, the ten strategi are not to be projected back to 508/7 under the cover of Herodotus' word φυλάρχους, how was the army organized in the years 508/7–501/0? In the first place the meaning of the entry in *Ath. Pol.* 22. 2 under 501/0 is that the change in the higher command during

Cleisthenes' acts of reform came then and not
earlier. Why did it come about so late?
A glance at military events provides one
answer, namely that the years in which
Athens was at war with Sparta, Boeotia,
Chalcis, and Aegina and was so hard pressed
that she tried twice to gain the alliance of
Persia, were not years in which one would
change radically the method of choosing the
higher command and perhaps also of or-
ganizing the forces; but by 501/0 the dangers
had largely passed away. If we ask how the
army was commanded in 508/7 to 501/0, we
can only say that at a time which followed
some thirty-six years of tyranny and three
years of stasis we do not know what was done
but that the Assembly is likely to have
elected ἐξ ἁπάντων Ἀθηναίων one polemarch
and several generals. It has been suggested
by Staveley, loc. cit., that in these years ten
strategi were elected 'by the ten separate
tribal assemblies'; for this I see no evidence
nor indeed much probability as the new
tribal assemblies cannot have started with
a sufficiently intimate knowledge of their
members for the purpose of making so im-
portant a choice. They took time to shake
down, and the new Boule came into action
probably in 504/3 (*Ath. Pol.* 22. 2) because,
as Sandys remarked, 'the reforms of Cleis-
thenes may have taken three years to get into
complete shape'.

The other passage is *Ath. Pol.* 61. 1
χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχὰς
ἁπάσας, στρατηγοὺς δέκα, πρότερον μὲν ἀφ᾽
⟨ἑκάστης⟩ φυλῆς ἕνα, νῦν δὲ ἐξ ἁπάντων. The
meaning is that the ten strategi are elected
'now' from all Athenians and, as Sandys re-
marked, 'without the distinction of tribe',
which had existed 'previously'; the fuller

expressions ἐξ ἁπάντων Ἀθηναίων and ἐξ
Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων are used at *Ath. Pol.* 56. 3
and 57. 1, in each case in contrast to election
from a subdivision of the people. The up-
ward definition of 'now' is uncertain in the
context (our knowledge of lists of generals
suggests a possible *terminus post quem* in 335/4
or 329/8), but the downward definition is
certain, that is in 327–324 B.C. (cf. J. Day
and M. Chambers, *Aristotle's History of
Athenian Democracy* 195 f.). As regards the
statements of the *Ath. Pol.* on contemporary
conditions we may quote Sandys's words:
'There can be no question as to . . . the
completely trustworthy character of the
Second Part'; and if anyone suspects cor-
ruption in ἐξ ἁπάντων at 61. 1 we have the
words in the citation of Pollux 8. 87. As it
happens six generals are known for the next
year, 323/2. Three of these are from one
tribe, and this illustrates the operation of the
contemporary system of electing στρατηγοὺς
δέκα . . . ἐξ ἁπάντων. If I am correct in my
interpretation, this passage does not cast any
new light on fifth-century practice, and I am
therefore unable to accept the view of
Staveley, loc. cit. 282, that reference to his
supposed fifth-century system of electing one
or more candidates who polled 80 per cent
or more of the votes as ἐξ ἁπάντων and the
rest of the ten at one a tribe (i.e. ἀπὸ φυλῆς)
'is contained in the words of *Ath. Pol.* 61. 1'.
Those who look to Plato's *Laws* for analogies
to Athenian practice will note that the three
strategi of the ideal state were elected with-
out distinction of tribe on straight votes οἷς
ἂν ἡ πλείστη χειροτονία γίγνηται (755 d), and
the twelve taxiarchs or tribal commanders
with distinction of tribe were elected on
straight votes likewise.